46CJEL_SACHS_73 (DO NOT DELETE)

2/5/2021 2:19 PM

Toxic Floodwaters: Strengthening the
Chemical Safety Regime for the
Climate Change Era
Noah M. Sachs*
Extreme flooding linked to climate change has caused toxic
chemical spills across the United States, yet policymakers are not
prioritizing industrial chemical safety in planning for climate
change. Many scholars and industry executives have argued that
existing private law mechanisms, such as insurance and tortbased deterrence, can adequately manage the risk of floodinduced chemical releases from industrial sites. But private law
mechanisms have failed to prevent past incidents of mass
contamination, and there is little evidence that tort law deters
industrial firms from the practices that put communities at risk.
In this Article, I engage in a comparative analysis of private law
and public law approaches and conclude that the United States
needs a robust effort, grounded in public law, to prevent toxic
floodwaters incidents. The new effort should involve regulations
and performance standards for chemical storage as well as other
reforms to close gaps in toxic-chemical management statutes
enacted nearly fifty years ago. These changes are necessary to
make our chemical regulatory regime more protective as industry
faces new risks from floods and rising seas.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, hurricanes and massive rainstorms have
caused unprecedented chemical disasters in the United States.1
As rising floodwater moves through industrial sites, it becomes
a toxic brew that mobilizes oil, sewage, and carcinogenic
chemicals—a pernicious pool of contamination that spreads to
nearby communities. When Hurricane Harvey hit Texas in
2017, for example, floods inundated manufacturing plants and
electricity generation stations, transporting contaminants such

1. Nicholas Santella et al., Petroleum and Hazardous Material Releases from
Industrial Facilities Associated with Hurricane Katrina, 30 RISK ANALYSIS 635, 639–43
(2010); Hiroko Tabuchi, Floods are Getting Worse, and 2,500 Chemical Sites Lie in the
Water’s Path, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/SF8Z-9YZM; John
Flesher, Michigan Flood Raises Fears of Pollution at Toxic Waste Site, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (May 21, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/b223d2e6fea6f2c8d82d60981708e7c6;
Steven Mufson, ExxonMobil Refineries are Damaged in Hurricane Harvey, Releasing
Hazardous Pollutants, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/23ZW93TZ.
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as heavy metals and carcinogens into homes, schools, and
businesses.2 Widespread contamination also occurred after
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (the Gulf Coast), Hurricane Maria in
2017 (Puerto Rico), and Hurricane Florence in 2017 (the
Carolinas). The toxic effects of these floods persist long after the
rain stops.3
I call these events toxic floodwaters, reflecting the dual
danger from massive water flows and the hazardous chemicals
they carry. So far, toxic floodwaters have been viewed as
isolated weather events and as problems of municipal disaster
response and recovery. Policymakers have not prioritized
prevention, nor have they fully appreciated how these disasters
are linked to each other through climate change.4 We are
unprepared for the intensification of these toxic events that will
occur by mid-century when rising seas will permanently
submerge parts of coastal cities.5
Both the government and the private sector are neglecting
this danger. The Trump Administration knee-capped the
Chemical Safety Board,6 which investigates chemical accidents,
2. Avann R. Newkirk III, Puerto Rico’s Environmental Catastrophe, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 18, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/2MGN-WMQV; Aristos Georgiou, Pollution
from Hurricane Florence Is So Bad You Can See It from Space, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 25,
2018), available at https://perma.cc/M2Q9-NWVU.
3. Frank Bajak & Lise Olsen, Hurricane Harvey’s Toxic Impact Deeper than Public
Told,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Mar.
23,
2018),
https://apnews.com/article/
e0ceae76d5894734b0041210a902218d; Emily Flitter & Richard Valdmanis, Oil and
Chemical Spills from Hurricane Harvey Big but Dwarfed by Katrina, REUTERS (Sept. 15,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-harvey-spills/oil-and-chemical-spillsfrom-hurricane-harvey-big-but-dwarfed-by-katrina-idUSKCN1BQ1E8.
4. See Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Sue to Adapt?, 99 MIN. L. REV. 2177, 2191
(2015) (“[T]he U.S. has mostly responded to adaptation challenges in an incremental,
ad hoc manner.”); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 VAND. L. REV. 363, 374 (“Only a few
adaptation planning efforts, and even fewer concrete policies, have been adopted, so far
mostly . . . by state and local governments.”).
5. See Kristina A. Dahl et al., Effective Inundation of Continental United States
Communities with 21st Century Sea Level Rise, 5 ELEMENTA: SCI. ANTHROPOCENE,
JULY 12, 2017, AT 10 TBL.1 (PROJECTING THAT UP TO 360 COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES WILL BE PARTIALLY OR COMPLETELY INUNDATED BY SEA LEVEL RISE BY 2060).
6. President Trump has proposed to eliminate the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) in
three separate budget plans and the formerly five-member board was down to a single
member in 2020. See EPA, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 19-N-0156, REPORT: FISCAL
YEAR 2019 U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGES (2019); Press Release, Chemical Safety Board, Statement from Dr.
Katherine Lemos, Chairperson and CEO of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (Apr. 23,
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and weakened the handful of federal regulations that relate to
chemical disaster prevention.7 Industry is failing to secure
hazardous materials against super-floods, which will occur more
frequently as the planet warms. The water will rise. The
question is how to limit the toxic damage.
In this Article, I propose an agenda for preventing toxic
floodwaters, situating this problem within the larger challenge
of climate change adaptation.8 The adaptation literature focuses
on reducing vulnerability and building resilience in the face of
extreme weather.9 While scholars have provided important
recommendations for governments to prepare for coastal
calamities such as hurricanes and sea level rise,10 few have
examined the particular challenge of preventing toxic releases
from industrial facilities when disaster strikes.11
2020), available at https://perma.cc/ZR54-7VZN (announcing the beginning of the sole
Board member’s term). The CSB is responsible for investigating major chemical plant
accidents, and while the Board does not hold regulatory power, its recommendations are
often adopted as industry standards. See Ari Natter, Trump Budget to Again Propose
the End of Chemical Safety Board, Source Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2019), available at
https://perma.cc/6HTG-WHH8.
7. In late 2019, the Trump Administration weakened several provisions of the
Chemical Disaster Rule that the Obama-era Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
had promulgated under the Clean Air Act. That rule was designed to impose planning
and spill prevention requirements on some of the largest manufacturing facilities in the
United States. See 40 C.F.R. § 68 (2019); Juliet Eilperin, Trump Administration Scales
Back Safety Rules Adopted After Deadly Chemical Explosion, WASH. POST (Nov. 21,
2019), available at https://perma.cc/CA7J-7RDV (noting that under the Trump
Administration’s proposal, companies will not have to disclose information about
chemicals stored at their facilities and can forego several safety measures required under
the Obama-era rule).
8. Scholars of climate change adaption examine the policy and legal changes that are
necessary for communities to adapt to rising seas, hotter summers, and changes in
agriculture and forestry. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Stationarity Is Dead—Long Live
Transformation, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 10 (2010); Ruhl, supra note 4, at 365–66.
9. Daniel H. Cole, Climate Change, Adaptation, and Development, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 1 (2008); Raina Wagner, Adapting Environmental Justice: In the Age of
Climate Change, Environmental Justice Demands a Combined Adaptation-Mitigation
Response, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153 (2011).
10. See, e.g., Blake Hudson, Land Development: A Super-Wicked Environmental
Problem, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1123 (2019); CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, FROM SURVIVING
TO THRIVING: EQUITY IN DISASTER PLANNING AND RECOVERY (2018); James Tobey et al.,
Practicing Coastal Adaptation to Climate Change: Lessons from Integrated Coastal
Management, 38 COASTAL MGMT. 317 (2010); Jesse Reiblich et al., Enabling and
Limiting Conditions of Coastal Adaptation: Local Governments, Land Uses, and Legal
Challenges, 22 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 156 (2017).
11. For articles about climate change adaptation that specifically focus on industry,
see Zachary Arnold, Preventing Industrial Disasters, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 243, 253
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Climate change adaptation must include planning for the
toxic impacts of extreme weather, not just for the immediate
damage from water and wind. These toxic impacts are the result
of decades of regulatory and land use choices that have led to lax
oversight of industrial facilities near population centers. They
also result from racist and neglectful policies that have
increased the vulnerability of marginalized populations to
displacement and toxic chemical exposures.12 Although flooding
itself stems from rain intensity and geography, the degree to
which hazardous chemicals become part of the deluge is, to some
extent, under our control. Different policy choices and legal
regimes can reduce the risk. Accordingly, we should not view
toxic floodwaters as Acts of God; they occur because of human
decisions about land use, facility siting, engineering, and
environmental regulation.
Preventing future disasters will require policy change across
all of these arenas of adaptation planning. This project has a
more limited scope, however, and I do not attempt to compile an
extensive laundry list of policy and legal reforms to prevent toxic
floodwaters. Instead, this Article explores the appropriate type
of legal regime to address the problem. In particular, I assess
whether we can continue to address toxic floodwaters by relying
on private law mechanisms such as insurance coverage and tortbased deterrence, or whether the problem requires new public
law responses, such as safety regulations and building
standards for flood-exposed facilities.
To conduct this
comparative analysis of private and public law, I engage the
literature on the relative merits of liability versus regulation in
addressing health and safety risks, drawing heavily on the work
of Steve Shavell.13
After exploring and comparing risk management
approaches, I conclude that private law approaches (the
(2017); Sarah Lamdan & Rebecca Bratspies, Taking a Page from the FDA’s Prescription
Medicine Information Rules: Reimagining Environmental Information for Climate
Change, 40 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 573 (2018); Robin Kundis Craig, Cleaning up
Our Toxic Coasts, 36 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2018).
12. See, e.g., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE
AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE KATRINA (2005); KATHLEEN TIERNEY, THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF
RISK: PRODUCING DISASTERS, PROMOTING RESILIENCE (2014).
13. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357 (1984).
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dominant strategy today) will not sufficiently protect
communities from toxic chemical exposure. Insurance, tort law,
and contractual arrangements cannot adequately address the
threat from toxic floodwaters because of the difficulty of
identifying the firms that are sources of hazardous chemical
releases and holding those firms responsible for damages. Once
oil and hazardous chemicals mix into the “toxic soup” that
characterizes toxic floodwaters incidents, it becomes nearly
impossible to prove that a particular industrial site was the
source of the specific chemicals found in the flood-damaged
community. Consequently, deterrent incentives for industry are
weak.
After showing why private law is not working to address the
toxic floodwaters problem, this Article proposes reforms
grounded in public law. I argue that the federal government
should strengthen the existing chemical regulatory regime to
become more responsive to recurrent flooding and other climate
change impacts. The existing regime, a creature of the 1970s
and 1980s, was designed for a different time and reflects
different priorities. Its focus is regulating intentional discharges
of toxic substances to air and water, as well as regulating the
presence of toxic chemicals in workplaces, food, and consumer
products. The regime only loosely regulates the conditions of
chemical storage and fails to protect communities from
accidental chemical releases. By way of illustration, the existing
regime would heavily control a factory’s routine discharge of
effluents into a river, but it would do nothing about a nearby
warehouse that stores hazardous substances that could be
released when the river floods.14
14. Throughout this Article, I use the terms “toxic chemicals” and “hazardous
substances” to refer to a broad set of chemicals that are harmful to human health in
small doses. See JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES
AND HAZARDOUS WASTES 3 (3d ed. 2018) (noting the lack of any firm dividing line
between “toxic” and “non-toxic” substances because toxicity depends on dosage). The
U.S. government has a number of different lists defining toxic chemicals under various
environmental statutes. See EPA, LIST OF LISTS: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF CHEMICALS
SUBJECT TO THE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT
(EPCRA), COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
ACT
(CERCLA)
AND
SECTION
112(R)
OF
THE
CLEAN
AIR
ACT,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-03/documents/list_of_lists.pdf.
There
are vast inconsistencies in the number and type of chemicals regulated under different
environmental statutes, with no standard federal definition of a “toxic” chemical. See
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Congress and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) should close these gaps by requiring improved standards
for chemical storage, restrictions on siting, inspections of
vulnerable facilities, and reforms to the Emergency Planning
and Emergency Right to Know Act (EPCRA). EPCRA is the
principal federal law that governs public notification of
inventories of hazardous chemicals and communication of
chemical releases.15 If the federal government does not act to
establish a stronger regulatory regime, then states should enact
these needed reforms under their own police powers.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I examine the
problem of toxic floodwaters, highlighting the common sources
of contamination and the damages from recent flooding events.
Part III compares private law and public law mechanisms for
preventing toxic floodwaters, assessing the merits of liability
and regulation as risk management tools. I conclude that
private law approaches for toxic floodwaters provide inadequate
incentives for firms to curtail their externalized risk to the
public, and I call for increased regulation of industrial facilities
vulnerable to flooding. Finally, in Part IV, I sketch a bolder
chemical safety agenda that closes unwarranted gaps in how we
manage toxic chemicals, an agenda that would better protect
communities from toxic flooding.
II.

TOXIC CHEMICAL FALLOUT FROM EXTREME WEATHER
EVENTS

Toxic contamination from flooding is not a new problem,16
but it was not until Hurricane Katrina in 2005 that researchers
used rigorous methodology to track flood-induced contamination
and document the chemical exposures of people affected by the
John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001, 11002 (1986).
16. Bob Strickley, 79 Years Ago the 1937 Flood Crests at 79.9 Feet, CIN. ENQUIRER
(Jan. 27, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/N9V5-RSEJ (recounting that during the
1937 Ohio River Flood, oil fires ignited on the river after gas tanks exploded); Earl
Benton, February 26, 1972: Coal Mining Dam Collapses in Buffalo Creek, W.V. PUB.
BROAD. (Feb. 26, 2019), available at https://perma.cc/6EYR-6MM6 (recounting that
during the 1972 Buffalo Creek flood in West Virginia, a coal waste dam collapsed,
releasing 132 million gallons of contaminated water).
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storm.17 After Katrina, researchers found that New Orleans and
surrounding parishes soaked for weeks in carcinogenic volatile
organic compounds and heavy metals such as mercury, zinc,
arsenic, and lead.18 Katrina, a Category 3 hurricane when it
struck Louisiana, was not the most powerful hurricane possible.
Yet it was still able to rip oil storage tanks off their foundations
and cause the discharge into the ocean of over eight million
gallons of oil.19
The worst toxic floodwaters incidents have occurred during
and after hurricanes, when torrential downpours and storm
surges have flooded industrial areas. Toxic floodwaters can also
occur as a result of heavy rainstorms, unrelated to any
hurricane, that overwhelm municipal sewer systems and cause
rivers to rise.20 Because the problem is not just a coastal issue,
policymakers across the United States need to understand the
origins of these events, their impacts, and the increasing risk of
these chemical disasters due to climate change.
A. Toxic Floodwaters Incidents and Health Effects
Toxic floodwaters incidents now occur almost every year, yet
we continue to view these incidents as unconnected and fail to
learn the lessons from past catastrophes.21 In 2012, Hurricane
17. Danny Reible, Hurricane Katrina: Environmental Hazards in the Disaster Area,
9 CITYSCAPE 53 (2007); see also Danny Reible et al., Toxic and Contaminant Concerns
Generated by Hurricane Katrina, 36 THE BRIDGE 5 (2006).
18. Robin Kundis Craig, Of Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: The Public Health Police
Power as a Means of Defending Against “Takings” Challenges to Coastal Regulation, 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 84, 103 (2014).
19. Luis A. Godoy, Performance of Storage Tanks in Oil Facilities Damaged by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 21 J. PERFORMANCE CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES 441, 443–
45 (2007); DONALD W. DAVIS, THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA ON
SOUTH LOUISIANA (2006), https://archive.epa.gov/emergencies/content/fss/web/pdf/
davis.pdf.
20. See Hayley T. Olds et al., High Levels of Sewage Contamination Released from
Urban Areas After Storm Events: A Quantitative Survey with Sewage Specific Bacterial
Indicators, 15 PLOS MED. 2 (2018) (“With the prediction of more intense rain events in
certain regions due to climate change, sewer overflows . . . may increase, resulting in
increases in waterborne pathogen burdens in waterways.”); Charles Duhigg, As Sewers
Fill, Waste Poisons Waterways, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2009), available at https://perma.cc/
E54P-WMKD (“[M]any sewer systems are still frequently overwhelmed . . . [and] sewage
is spilling into waterways.”).
21. Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law After Katrina: Reforming Environmental
Law by Reforming Environmental Lawmaking, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (2007) (“We
seem poised, perversely, to demonstrate our human spirit by rebuilding in flooded areas
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Sandy, a Category 2 storm, caused massive damage to industry
in the New York area, including a 300,000-gallon oil spill at a
refinery in New Jersey and damage to about 80 sewage
treatment plants.22 In 2017, Hurricane Harvey hit Galveston
and Houston, killing eighty-eight people, leaving thousands
without homes, and dropping more than forty inches of rain in
just forty-eight hours.23 Beaumont, Texas, received 64.58 inches
of rain, a record for a single storm in the United States.24
Hurricane Harvey is the most vivid example of the toxic
consequences of extreme weather. Petrochemical firms along
the Gulf Coast were unprepared for a storm of such magnitude,
and more than 650 facilities in Texas and Louisiana were
exposed to Harvey’s floodwaters.25 Industry reported nearly 100
releases of hazardous substances to the National Response
Center, which tracks reports of oil spills and chemical releases.26
In addition to the flooding of industrial plants, Harvey flooded
more than 800 sewage treatment facilities and 13 Superfund
sites, carrying hazardous materials across the region.27 Within
and our resolve by restoring the industrial, commercial, and residential activities illsuited for those locations.”).
22. Sandy Responsible for 300,000 Gallon Oil Spill on U.S. East Coast, THE MARITIME
EXECUTIVE (Nov. 1, 2012), available at https://perma.cc/HZU7-QGMG; John Manuel,
The Long Road to Recovery: Environmental Health Impacts of Hurricane Sandy, 121
ENV. HEALTH PERSP. 152 (2013). One plant on the Passaic River spilled an estimated
2.75 billion gallons of untreated human waste into Newark Bay. Id.
23. HOUS. HEALTH DEPT., HURRICANE HARVEY 2017 RESPONSE REPORT 2 (2017),
available at https://perma.cc/EVW3-EAJA.
24. John D. Harden, Weather Service Confirms a New Record 64 Inches of Rain Fell
During Harvey, HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 28, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/2XRNLYKQ.
25. Hurricane Harvey’s Impact on Energy and Industrial Facilities, ARCGIS ONLINE
(citing G.R. Brakenbridge & A.J. Kettner, DFO Flood Event 4510, DARTMOUTH FLOOD
OBSERVATORY (Aug. 31, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/V9BV-DUXX),
https://arcg.is/i40nr (identifying the facilities—such as wastewater treatment plants,
petroleum refineries, and Superfund sites—that were potentially exposed to Harvey’s
floodwaters, shown in blue).
26. Troy Griggs et al., More Than 40 Sites Released Hazardous Pollutants Because of
Hurricane Harvey, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/8WDVJD8M. The largest spill was from ExxonMobil’s plant in Baytown, Texas, which released
about 457 million gallons of stormwater mixed with untreated wastewater, including oil
and grease. Bajak & Olsen, supra note 3.
27. Arelis R. Hernández et al., Texas Faces Environmental Concerns as Wastewater,
Drinking Water Systems Compromised, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/VS5U-Z22S; Hurricane Harvey Rains Flood Toxic Superfund Sites in
Texas, CNBC (Sept. 3, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/252U-2ULR.
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days, Houston residents reported skin infections and respiratory
problems,28 and contamination was found in homes, schools, and
businesses.29
Hurricane Harvey demonstrated that massive rainfall
events can cause not only extensive water contamination, but
also toxic air emissions.30 Pounding rain caused roof damage
that led to chemical releases to the air, and floodwaters damaged
containment, refrigeration, and pressurized tank systems,
resulting in releases of hazardous gases.31 At the Arkema
chemical plant in Crosby, Texas, rising water from Harvey
knocked out the refrigeration system and backup generators,
causing an explosion of organic peroxides, highly combustible
compounds used to make plastics. The explosion released more
than 23,000 pounds of toxic constituents, including carcinogens
such as ethylbenzene and 1,2,4-trimethylbenzene.32 Subsequent
tests showed elevated levels of metals, dioxins, and other
contaminants in nearby soils.33
28. ENV’T TEX., Fact Sheet: Environmental Concerns About Oil and Gas Spills After
Hurricane Harvey (Sept. 12, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/NXT4-2YMD.
29. Sheila Kaplan & Jack Healy, Houston’s Floodwaters Are Tainted, Testing Shows,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/9KVC-EBKN (“[S]cientists
found what they considered astonishingly high levels of E. coli in one family’s living room
– levels 135 times those considered safe – as well as elevated levels of lead, arsenic and
other heavy metals in sediment from the floodwaters in the kitchen.”); Leslie Sanchez,
Toxic Homes: The Invisible Threat after Hurricane Harvey, CBS NEWS (Aug. 24, 2018),
available at https://perma.cc/J4PT-GZMQ (finding that, after Hurricane Harvey, the air
quality in flooded homes “matched the outdoor pollution of some of the world’s most
contaminated cities such as Mumbai and Beijing”).
30. Adam Allington, Flooded Houston Facing Air Threat, Too, With Toxic Gas
Releases, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 2017); see also EPA, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 20P-0062, EPA NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS EMERGENCY PLANNING TO BETTER ADDRESS AIR
QUALITY CONCERNS DURING FUTURE DISASTERS (2019).
31. U.S. CHEM. SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., EXTREME WEATHER,
EXTREME CONSEQUENCES: CSB INVESTIGATION OF THE ARKEMA CROSBY FACILITY AND
HURRICANE HARVEY (2018), available at https://perma.cc/5EXX-2TRT. According to
Texas regulators, Hurricane Harvey caused the petrochemical industry alone to release
more than two million pounds of toxic air pollutants during five days in August 2017,
roughly 40 percent of the total air toxics that the entire Houston area released in all of
2016. Griggs et al., More Than 40 Sites Released Hazardous Pollutants Because of
Hurricane Harvey, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/5KGL-5XAL.
32. Lauren Mulhern, Comment, The Arkema Chemical Facility Incident: How
Regulation of Reactive Chemicals and Incorporation of Climate Change Risks in
Emergency Response Planning Could Mitigate and Prevent Future Accidental Chemical
Releases, 30 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 143, 150 (2019).
33. Dianna Wray, Arkema Released Thousands of Pounds of Chemicals in Air and
Water,
New
Lawsuit
Says,
HOUS.
PRESS
(Oct.
5,
2017),
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In rural areas, toxic floodwaters present yet another kind of
threat to humans: agricultural contamination containing E. coli
and other harmful bacteria. In 2018, for example, flooding from
Hurricane Florence inundated hog-waste lagoons in North
Carolina, spreading fecal contamination throughout the state’s
southeastern communities.34
In 2019, severe flooding in
Midwestern farm communities spread bacterial contamination
from animal waste across 300 counties.35 Although there was no
immediate sampling of private water wells for contamination,
the impacted area was estimated to include nearly one million
private wells.36
The high levels of harmful contaminants in floodwaters pose
both immediate dangers and long-term health risks that
continue long after the floodwaters recede. After hurricanes
Florence and Harvey, for example, researchers documented that
residents in North Carolina and Texas experienced headaches,
nausea, and eye irritation for weeks.37 In Louisiana, sediment
samples showed elevated levels of arsenic ten months after the
end of Hurricane Katrina.38
This lingering chemical contamination is an environmental
justice issue, disproportionately affecting low-income and
minority communities in close proximity to hazardous

https://www.houstonpress.com/news/arkema-residents-say-they-were-hit-by-chemicalreleases-in-both-air-and-water-during-hurricane-harvey-9847626.
34. Rebecca Beitsch, Few Wells Tested for Contamination After Major Flooding from
Hurricanes, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE (Dec. 14, 2018), available at
https://perma.cc/56Y8-996R (discussing contamination of water supplies by hog waste
and coal ash).
35. Nadia Kounang, Midwest Flooding Threatens the Water Safety in 1 Million Wells,
CNN (Mar. 29, 2019), available at https://perma.cc/4D36-E7DY.
36. Id.
37. Pamela D’Angelo, Report Details the Potential Danger of Toxic Floodwaters, VA.
PUB. RADIO (Mar. 6, 2019), available at https://perma.cc/FW62-E2R8; Frank Bajak &
Lise Olsen, Hurricane Harvey’s Toxic Impact Deeper Than Public Told, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Mar. 23, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/GT4S-DSTV; Jen Christensen, The
Hidden Dangers of Flooding, CNN (Sept. 13, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/9GJPXVK9; Juanita Constible, The Emerging Public Health Consequences of Hurricane
Harvey, NRDC: EXPERT BLOG (Aug. 29, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/5CXZ-EXX9;
Timothy B. Erickson & Julia Brooks, After a Disaster, Contaminated Floodwater Can
Pose a Threat for Months to Come, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 3, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/6KCX-UEAZ.
38. Miriam Rotkin-Ellman et al., Arsenic Contamination in New Orleans Soil:
Temporal Changes Associated with Flooding, 110 ENVTL. RES. 19 (2010).
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facilities.39 Race is correlated with topography in many U.S.
cities, with communities of color isolated in low-lying areas
through exclusionary zoning and construction of public housing
in unfavorable, flood-prone terrain.40 This correlation was made
vivid during and after Hurricane Katrina, when low-lying,
African-American neighborhoods, such as the Lower Ninth
Ward, were devastated by flooding.41 The correlation between
race and topography was confirmed in a comprehensive study by
geographers that examined 146 cities in the South.42 They found
a “strong pattern” of statistically significant correlations
between neighborhoods of color and neighborhoods at low
elevation, with the pattern holding in 36% of the southern
cities.43 The reverse pattern, with white people in low-lying
areas, was found in 17% of the cities.44 Many of these cities were
coastal cities in Florida and the Carolinas, where white
residents dominated the pricey real estate near the beaches.45
Toxic floodwaters do not affect people equally. In addition to
the important variable of topography, lack of transportation
options in low-income communities makes these residents more
likely to shelter during a storm rather than evacuate.46 Children
and the elderly also appear to be more at risk from the pollution
carried by floodwaters. Children are vulnerable because they
have more skin surface area per unit of body weight than adults,

39. See Brie Sherwin, After the Storm: The Importance of Acknowledging
Environmental Justice in Sustainable Development and Disaster Preparedness, 29 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 273, 278 (2019) (explaining that flooding after natural disasters
leads to an increase in water-borne contaminants in low-income communities that are
disproportionately located near industrial areas); Danny Vinik, ‘People Just Give Up’:
Low-income Hurricane Victims Slam Federal Relief Programs, POLITICO (May 29, 2018),
available at https://perma.cc/EB5F-9Q8Y; Emily Badger, Pollution is Segregated, Too,
WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/HW2L-M5W5.
40. Jeff Ueland & Barney Warf, Racialized Topographies: Altitude and Race in
Southern Cities, 96 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 50, 55–56 (2006).
41. John Simerman, New Orleans’ Lower 9th Ward Is Still Reeling from Hurricane
Katrina’s Damage 15 Years Later, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 29, 2020) (noting that the
neighborhood was 98% Black when Katrina struck and has become a world symbol for
“poverty, neglect and utter devastation”).
42. Ueland & Warf, supra note 40.
43. Id. at 59, 73.
44. Id. at 59.
45. Id. at 62.
46.Adrian Florido, Why Stay During a Hurricane? Because It’s Not As Simple As ‘Get
Out’, NPR (Oct. 18, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/5VCF-7DJB.
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and therefore face higher exposure through skin absorption.47
The elderly are vulnerable because they are less likely to
evacuate than other adults.48
Researchers have documented a range of illnesses linked to
toxic
floodwaters,
including
respiratory
distress,
gastrointestinal diseases,49 and diseases of the brain, blood, and
kidneys.50 More research is needed, however, on the long-term
health effects of toxic floodwaters. One of the challenges of
identifying these effects is that researchers have difficulty
sampling and testing the waters at the point of maximum
human exposure, during the high water mark of a flood before
the waters recede.51 Further, researchers have documented that
toxic floodwaters release hazardous chemicals in multiple forms
over time: first through water, then via sediments, and
ultimately through airborne dust, making it difficult to trace
illnesses to discrete contaminants.52
Compounding the
complexity of studying this problem, chemicals in toxic
floodwaters have synergistic effects.53 That is, they act in
tandem with each other and elevate health risks in communities
exposed to multiple chemicals.54

47. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING
HEALTH RISKS IN CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH EXPOSURE TO CHEMICALS 22 (2011).
48. Vincanne Adams et al., Aging Disaster: Mortality, Vulnerability, and Long-Term
Recovery Among Katrina Survivors, 30 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY 247, 251 (May 2011) (65%
of the elderly in New Orleans lacked transportation options to evacuate before Hurricane
Katrina).
49. Dell D. Saulnier et al., No Calm After the Storm: A Systematic Review of Human
Health Following Flood and Storm Disasters, 32 PREHOSPITAL & DISASTER MED. 568,
572 (2017).
50. Erickson & Brooks, supra note 37.
51. Mike Martindale & Kalea Hall, After Flood Reached Dow, Superfund Pollution
Regulators Have Yet to Test Water, DET. NEWS (May 21, 2020), available at
https://perma.cc/ZG28-CJXL.
52. Hurricane Katrina: Assessing the Present Environmental Status: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Env’t and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 109th Cong. 88–89 (2005) (statement of Erik D. Olson, Senior Attorney,
NRDC).
53. Karen A. Gottlieb, The Environmental Setting—The Toxicity of Mixtures, in 1
TOXIC TORTS PRAC. GUIDE § 3:21 (2019); Sanne H. Knudsen, Regulating Cumulative
Risk, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2313 (2017).
54. In the aftermath of Katrina, mixtures of carcinogens and nephrotoxicants were
found that could cause a range of health issues including cardiovascular, kidney,
gastrointestinal, and neurological complications. Floodwater sampling showed mixtures
of at least two toxic substances in more than 43% of sample locations. Mary Fox et al.,
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B. Sources of Contamination
To prevent toxic floodwaters, policymakers and emergency
managers need information about which facilities might pose a
threat to surrounding communities. Due to lax oversight,
however, there is no comprehensive inventory of vulnerable
facilities. This unfortunate data gap hampers both public and
private emergency planning efforts.
Identifying such facilities involves understanding both
details of the chemicals stored on site and the facility’s degree of
flood-exposure. The risk that a facility poses to a community
depends on the volume and toxicity of substances on site, the
storage conditions of those substances, the proximity of the
facility to residences, and the facility’s flood exposure.55 Flood
exposure, in turn, depends on the elevation of the facility, its
proximity to water bodies, and its proximity to the ocean (which
increases hurricane storm-surge exposure even if there is no
water body adjacent to the facility).56
The U.S. experience with toxic floodwaters since Hurricane
Katrina highlights two important points about the sources of
potential contamination.
First, it is clear that the problem is not confined to the
chemical industry, major manufacturers, or large facilities that
might have millions of gallons of hazardous chemicals on site.
Instead, nearly any flood-exposed facility that stores toxic
chemicals, pesticides, oil, gasoline, human sewage, or animal
waste is a potential source of contamination. While large
industrial plants tend to get the most attention in the wake of a
storm, the true risk is much broader. Policymakers, therefore,
need to look beyond industry-specific or neighborhood-specific
approaches to reduce the risk of chemical releases. Planning
must proceed from the recognition that thousands of small
facilities—from gas stations to manufacturing operations to

Potential for Chemical Mixture Exposures and Health Risks in New Orleans PostHurricane Katrina, 15 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 831, 837–839 (2009).
55. See NOAH SACHS & DAVID FLORES, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, TOXIC
FLOODWATERS: THE THREAT OF CLIMATE-DRIVEN CHEMICAL DISASTER IN VIRGINIA’S
JAMES RIVER WATERSHED 11–13 (2019).
56. Id. at 3, 11, 13.
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metal finishing plants—may need to harden their infrastructure
against flooding.
Second, an effective legal regime to address toxic floodwaters
must include an inventory process to identify at-risk facilities.
In the United States, we have barely begun this task. There is
no comprehensive national inventory of industrial facilities that
are both flood-exposed and that store hazardous substances.
Some studies have attempted to identify such facilities
regionally. In 2019, for example, researchers identified more
than 840 facilities in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia that
are both flood-exposed and that likely store hazardous
substances, based on the statutes under which they are
regulated.57 The study highlights that flood-exposed industrial
facilities are often concentrated together and are often located
in close proximity to low-income communities. For example, the
study identified 164 such facilities in a single census tract in
Norfolk.58
Past studies have obscured the gravity of the threat from
toxic floodwaters by failing to identify the full scope of
vulnerable facilities. The New York Times, for example, used
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data to identify industrial
facilities that have the potential to release chemicals during
floods because of their elevation or location near waterways.59 It
found more than 2,500 such facilities across the United States
and documented the potential for widespread contamination.60
The study significantly understated the risk, however, because
only large manufacturing operations in certain industries that
use specific EPA-listed chemicals are subject to TRI reporting.61
The study did not capture the risks from smaller facilities or
from oil and chemical storage facilities that do not ordinarily
release pollutants to the environment. Such storage facilities
are not subject to TRI reporting, yet they are among the most

57. Id. at 19.
58. Id. at 14.
59. Tabuchi, supra note 1.
60. Id.
61. Facilities are subject to TRI reporting if they have ten or more employees; are in
certain industries, such as mining, chemicals, or paper manufacturing; and manufacture
or process more than 25,000 pounds of certain listed chemicals annually. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 372.

46CJEL_SACHS_73 (DO NOT DELETE)

88

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

2/5/2021 2:19 PM

[Vol. 46:1

worrisome facilities in terms of flood exposure because of their
location along waterways and the vast volumes of hazardous
liquids stored in tanks. Similarly, numerous studies have
explored the impacts of floods on existing Superfund sites near
the coasts.62 But these studies are too narrow in scope.
Superfund sites are just one component of a larger problem:
there are tens of thousands of facilities that could become
sources of hazardous contamination during a storm.
C. Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier
In addition to identifying facilities that are currently at risk
of flooding, policymakers should approach the toxic floodwaters
problem with a long-term planning horizon that accounts for
extreme weather and climate change.63 Policymakers need to
understand how climate change will contribute to increased
rainfall and flooding, which will put more facilities in the path
of floodwaters and increase the risk that toxic contaminants will
spread across communities. The legal regime to address toxic
floodwaters needs to be flexible, adaptable, and resilient.
One of the core principles of climate change adaptation
planning is that “stationarity is dead.”64 That is, policymakers
cannot assume that present conditions of weather or physical
infrastructure will continue, and they must build adaptability
and resilience into planning scenarios. Planning for the vast
climatic changes of the coming decades will require collecting
huge amounts of scientific information, sharing that information
with all levels of government and the private sector, and likely

62. See, e.g., EPA, OFF. OF LAND & EMERGENCY MGMT., EVALUATION OF REMEDY
RESILIENCE AT SUPERFUND NPL AND SAA SITES (2018); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-20-73, SUPERFUND: EPA SHOULD TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO MANAGE
RISKS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE (2019); Jason Dearen et al., AP Finds Climate Change
Risk for 327 Toxic Superfund Sites, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 22, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/T3ZQ-L5ZV.
63. As of late 2020, the majority of states have no climate adaptation plans or
legislation. See GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR., STATE AND LOCAL ADAPTATION PLANS,
available at https://perma.cc/H5S9-ZSDU(last accessed Oct. 11, 2020) (reporting that
seventeen states have adopted some kind of state climate adaptation plan; most adopted
over a decade ago).
64. See Craig, supra note 8, at 9.
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spending hundreds of billions of dollars on new infrastructure
investments.65
Effective adaptation planning for toxic floodwaters will need
to examine two distinct stages of the threat. In the first stage,
which will unfold between now and mid-century, climate change
will lead to widespread flooding through hurricane storm surge
and heavy rainfall events unrelated to hurricanes.66 In the
second stage, after mid-century, rising seas will permanently
submerge some coastal industrial areas, creating contamination
zones and forcing population retreat.
1. Near-term Climate Change Impacts
In the near-term, climate change will increase the threat of
toxic floodwaters by producing more rainfall and more frequent
hurricanes compared to 20th-century averages. According to
federal government scientists, the number of Category 4 and
Category 5 hurricanes in the North Atlantic is expected to
increase by 50% compared to last century, with a 20% increase
in average rainfall volume from each hurricane.67 Storm surge
flood levels will increase,68 and storm surge will travel farther
inland.69 All of these changes will put more industrial facilities
in the path of flooding. More flooding will in turn lead to more
toxic chemical releases because the mechanisms that industry
uses to avoid chemical releases, such as steel storage tanks,
secondary containment, and temperature control devices, can
fail or corrode when inundated.70
65. Id.
66. See REIDMILLER ET AL., U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, Summary
Findings, in FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOL. II: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND
ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (2018) [hereinafter FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT VOL. II].
67. Kevin Walsh et al., Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change, 7 WIRES CLIMATE
CHANGE 65–89 (2016).
68. Ning Lin et al., Physically Based Assessment of Hurricane Surge Threat Under
Climate Change, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 462, 462–467 (2012).
69. Lynne Carter et al., Southeast, in FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT VOL.
II at 744, available at https://perma.cc/ZN62-P6VT. Brad Plumer, Rising Seas Could
Menace Millions Beyond Shorelines, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2020), available
at https://perma.cc/JRH2-SBJV (discussing study that found that only one-third of future
coastal flooding risk came from rising sea itself, while two-thirds of the risk came from
a likely increase in extreme high tides, storm surge, and breaking waves).
70. SACHS & FLORES, supra note 55, at 9.
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Inland areas are not immune from the danger. Warmer air
holds more moisture, creating conditions for torrential rainfall
far away from the coasts, massive inland flooding, and dam
breaches.71 Scientists predict heavier rainfall for most of the
United States in the coming decades.72 In the southeast, for
example, scientists predict that, by 2100, the number of heavy
rainfall incidents will double compared to the historic average,
and the volume of rainfall during these events will increase by
21%.73
The devastating floods in Iowa and Nebraska in the spring
of 2019 are an example of toxic contamination spread by heavy
inland precipitation. In the year preceding the floods, Iowa
experienced 50.73 inches of precipitation, the wettest twelvemonth period ever recorded there.74 Rivers, already running
high due to the intense rain, were further fed by rapid snowmelt
caused by warm temperatures.75 The flood damage was
estimated at $2 billion in Iowa and over $1.3 billion in
Nebraska.76

71. For many major American cities, the past decade has been the wettest decade since
rainfall records began in the nineteenth century. See Azi Paybarah, Yes, The Weather
Has Been Crazy Rainy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019), available at https://perma.cc/T6ADZZZT (noting 2018 as New York City’s fourth wettest year on record); Houston’s Annual
Top 10 List, NAT’L WEATHER SERV. & NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
available at https://perma.cc/AXS9-CDM6 (noting 2017 as Houston’s wettest year on
record); Jennifer Larino, A Look Back at the 20 Rainiest Years in New Orleans History,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.nola.com/news/weather/article_
7da3a9a4-fe30-5a45-97ba-3d2abc87ba75.html (reporting that five of the top twenty
rainiest years on record in New Orleans occurred between 2007 and 2017).
72. Katherine Hayhoe et al., Our Changing Climate, in FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT VOL. II, supra note 66, at 88, https://perma.cc/5RUS-UYL5.
73. Carter et al., supra note 69, at 762.
74. Gage Miskimen, It’s a Record: Iowa Has Wettest 12-month Period Since Official
Records Began in 1895, DES MOINES REG. (June 14, 2019), available at
https://perma.cc/E5M7-AB2D.
75. Sam Bloch, Historic Flood Losses Faced by Nebraska Farmers “Will Impact Food
on Your Table”, THE COUNTER (Mar. 19, 2019), available at https://perma.cc/ET2MKEFP; Mitch Smith et al., ‘It’s Probably over for Us’: Record Flooding Pummels Midwest
When Farmers Can Least Afford It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), available at
https://perma.cc/X4U3-HU2K.
76. Donnelle Eller, Farm Losses Drive Iowa’s Flood Damage to $2 Billion, Farm
Bureau Economists Estimate, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 3 2019), https://perma.cc/WU67KRFP; Matthew S. Schwartz, Nebraska Faces over $1.3 Billion in Flood Loss, NPR
(Mar. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/5G23-JSJC.
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2. Long-term Climate Change Impacts
Around mid-century, the toxic floodwaters threat in the
United States will become far more serious. Wetter weather and
intense hurricanes will remain major problems, but the new
challenge will be the permanent inundation of coastal areas by
rising seas.
The U.S. Global Climate Change Research Program, created
by Congress to report on climate science and inform federal
policy, projects that global average sea levels will rise anywhere
from 0.3 meters to 2.5 meters by 2100.77 The mid-range estimate
(1.5 meters by 2100) is a useful estimate for planning purposes
because the estimated chance of exceeding it is less than 5%.78
In the United States, 1.5 meters of sea level rise would put
hundreds of oil terminals, refineries, and sewage treatment
plants under water and would submerge large sections of lowlying cities like New York, Washington, Boston, and Miami.79
The Global Climate Change Research Program also estimates
that nearly the entire U.S. coastline, with the exception of
Alaska, will experience sea level rise greater than the global
average.80
Sea level rise is both an environmental threat and among the
biggest long-term threats to the economy of the United States.81
More than half of the U.S. population lives in coastal counties,
and those counties generate 58% of U.S. GDP.82 As sea levels
rise, water will inundate industrial zones, contaminate potable
water supplies, and push hurricane-related storm surge farther

77. WILLIAM V. SWEET ET AL., NAT’L OCEANOGRAPHIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES 14 (2017),
available at https://perma.cc/V8QJ-ADEL.
78. Id. at 22.
79. Leslie-Ann L. Dupigny-Giroux et al., Northeast, in FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT VOL. II, supra note 66, at 694–695, available at https://perma.cc/3ECQWZJ2; Elizabeth Fleming et al., Coastal Effects, in FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT VOL. II, supra note 66, at 329–331 (2018), available at
https://perma.cc/ZJ93-ZUKC.
80. SWEET ET AL., supra note 77, at 30.
81. Sea Level Rise to Cause Major Economic Impact in the Absence of Further Climate
Action, Science Daily (Jan. 27, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/A7BA-SS8V.
82. DARYA MONOVI, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS AND
VULNERABILITY TO CHEMICAL SPILLS TRIGGERED BY EXTREME WEATHER (2020),
available at https://perma.cc/N4QA-YYK9.
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inland.83
Sea level rise is a threat to power plants,
manufacturing facilities, and refineries, as well as to municipal
drinking water and the sanitary infrastructure that cities have
built up over 100 years to remove waste and sewage.84
The United States will not have to wait until the end of the
century before coastal infrastructure is submerged. By 2050—
within the timespan of a typical 30-year residential mortgage—
researchers project that global sea levels could rise a halfmeter.85 Studies of over a dozen large U.S. cities, prepared by
the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, confirm the projection
of a half-meter of sea level rise by 2050.86 Such an increase
would likely flood thousands of facilities that store hazardous
substances. Yet most cities have not even begun to examine how
to protect industrial infrastructure—and nearby communities—
from this risk.87
3. Climate Change and the End of Stationarity
In identifying the industrial operations most at risk,
policymakers should adhere to the “stationarity is dead”
principle by projecting weather conditions as they will change
over decades rather than relying on past weather records.88
Facilities that have never flooded in the past may pose a grave
danger of toxic releases in the future because of changing
weather patterns and increased rainfall.
Unfortunately, FEMA flood-plain maps, which remain one of
the major planning tools used to guide real estate development,
still reflect stationarity. Created from past weather records,
FEMA flood-plain maps do not reflect projections of future
flooding due to climate change, yet these maps are used for
83. See JEFF GOODELL, THE WATER WILL COME: RISING SEAS, SINKING CITIES, AND
(2017).
84. Id.
85. SWEET ET AL., supra note 77, at 23 tbl.5.
86. U.S. Sea Level Rise Report Cards, VA. INST. MARINE SCI., available at
https://perma.cc/DH88-NBXV.
87. See Dahl, supra note 5; Xinyu Fu et al., Adaptation Planning for Sea Level Rise,
60 J. ENVTL. PLANNING & MGMT. 249, 253–256 (2017).
88. Southeast Texas, for example, has experienced four 500-year flood events since
2014 (a 500-year flood event is one with a 1-in-500 chance of occurring in any year). Erica
Grieder, Judge’s Ruling in Harvey Flooding Case Holds Message for Government, HOUS.
CHRON. (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/columnists/grieder/
article/Judge-s-ruling-in-Harvey-flooding-case-holds-14923326.php.
THE REMAKING OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD
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everything from zoning plans to building inspections to
insurance-rate determinations.89 With storms dropping more
rain in shorter timespans, however, climate scientists now
widely believe that these maps do not accurately depict flood
risk.90 According to one federal study, while FEMA flood maps
depict about 13 million Americans living in 100-year flood
plains, the true number is 40.8 million and is projected to rise to
over 60 million by 2050 with current population growth trends.91
The flaws in FEMA flood-plain maps have serious
consequences. Because of the shortcomings of these maps,
managers of facilities that store hazardous substances may not
be aware that their facilities are vulnerable to floods. They may
not take any precautions, such as elevating hazardous
substances or building secondary containment for chemical
storage tanks, because they do not realize that the facilities they
manage are located in a flood zone. Correspondingly, nearby
communities are left in the dark about the true nature of their
contamination risk.
Policymakers, insurers, and facility
managers should not rely solely on FEMA flood maps to
determine vulnerability; they need to supplement the FEMA
maps with more accurate elevation and weather data that
incorporates future projections for rainfall and sea level rise. By
relying on FEMA maps, we are driving forward through the
climate crisis while looking in the rearview mirror.

89. Technical Fact Sheet No. 1.3.: Using a Digital Flood Insurance Rate Map (DFIRM)
1, 2, in FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FEMA P-499, HOME BUILDER’S GUIDE TO
COASTAL CONSTRUCTION TECHNICAL FACT SHEET SERIES (Dec. 2010) (noting that FEMA
flood maps are used for “community planning, zoning, and building inspection programs
that require specific structure design and new construction in high-hazard coastal
floodplains.”). See also Evan Isaacson, Stormwater Infrastructure and Management:
Unsafe for Human Contact 57, in CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, FROM SURVIVING TO
THRIVING: EQUITY IN DISASTER PLANNING AND RECOVERY 57, 57–64 (2018) (discussing
flaws in FEMA flood plain designations around Houston).
90. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-17-110,
FEMA NEEDS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF ITS MAPPING PROGRAMS (2017) (describing
FEMA’s mismanagement and lack of oversight resulting in inadequate or outdated flood
mapping); Michael Keller et al., Outdated and Unreliable: FEMA’s Faulty Flood Maps
Put Homeowners at Risk, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/A3P4-GRW6
(noting that FEMA’s floodplain maps do not account for factors such as rapid rain
accumulation, climate change, or unexpected population growth).
91. Oliver E.J. Wing et al., Estimates of Present and Future Flood Risk in the
Conterminous United States, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 034023, 2018, at 1, 3 fig.2.
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To be sure, toxic contamination is not the only impact for
which policymakers need to prepare as the oceans rise. They
must also adopt plans and policies for evacuating communities,
replacing housing, protecting people during blackouts,
safeguarding the electric grid, and managing the retreat of
communities from the coasts. It is useful to situate prevention
strategies for toxic floodwaters in the context of these broader
challenges of adapting to rising seas. As Alex Camacho has
noted, climate change adaptation policy can either aim at
altering the environment to minimize adverse effects of climate
change (such as constructing sea walls to protect against
hurricanes) or at altering the way private actors interact with
the environment (such as requiring the elevation of critical
utilities within buildings).92 The most promising strategies for
preventing toxic floodwaters fall into the latter category. By
altering the incentives and requirements for industrial
operators, policymakers can mitigate risk “inside the fenceline”;
that is, they can reduce the risk that toxic chemicals stored
inside industrial facilities will escape when extreme weather
strikes.
III.

RESPONSES TO TOXIC FLOODWATERS THROUGH PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC LAW

Despite repeated toxic floodwater disasters that have
affected multiple states and millions of Americans, prevention of
toxic floodwaters has largely been left to ad hoc private sector
decision making. Some observers see this as a good thing:
scholars and industry executives have argued that firms have a
financial incentive to maintain control of their chemical
inventory and prevent releases, so new forms of ex ante
government regulation are unnecessary to prevent toxic
floodwaters. In this view, firms are sufficiently motivated to
take safety precautions through economic incentives and
liability exposure for any chemical releases.
Many

92. Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 21–22 (2009).
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environmental groups, in contrast, are calling for increased
federal oversight of industrial facilities to manage flood risks.93
This argument over how to address toxic floodwaters is, at
its core, an argument over the relative merits of private law and
public law in responding to a growing threat to public health.
The private law approach relies on the incentive of firms to
limit tort liability, maintain control over valuable chemical
inventory, and reduce premiums for liability insurance. The
private law approach modifies behavior in a decentralized way
by exposing firms to potential damage claims after a storm hits
if they do not reasonably contain hazardous chemicals.
Under a public law approach, in contrast, public agencies
would set regulatory standards for flood-exposed facilities and
enforce those standards through inspections, facility
registration, spill-prevention planning, and fines. The public
law approach modifies behavior of firms in a more direct way,
through enforcing compliance with regulatory standards and
requiring vulnerable firms to take precautionary measures
before any release of chemicals occurs.
In this Part, I explore this crucial question of whether toxic
floodwaters can be addressed adequately through continued
reliance on private law and private incentives, or whether the
problem instead needs to be addressed through a new regulatory
regime. In the comparative analysis that follows, I draw heavily
on Steve Shavell’s classic article, Liability for Harm Versus
Regulation of Safety.94 Shavell’s article provides a broad
framework for risk assessment and decision-making in diverse
fields from medicine to pesticides to air pollution. Here, it
provides useful guidance for designing the optimal legal regime
for toxic floodwaters.
A. The Choice of Legal Regimes
The choice of the optimal legal regime to manage a health or
safety risk depends on the characteristics of the risk. According
to Shavell, there are four factors that determine the optimal
approach: the knowledge gap between firms and regulators, the
93. ENV’T. TEX., supra note 28; CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 10; SACHS
& FLORES, supra note 55.
94. Shavell, supra note 13.
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risk-producing party’s ability to financially cover any damage
claims, the likelihood that firms may not face the threat of suit
for harm done, and the relative administrative costs of relying
on private law or public law.95
The first factor identified by Shavell is the difference
between the level of knowledge about the nature or degree of risk
possessed by private parties compared to regulatory
authorities.96 Where crucial information about the nature or
degree of risk is in the hands of private actors, private law is
preferable. As an example, Shavell discusses the risk posed by
chopping down a tree, where the activity poses some risk that
the tree or branches will fall on neighboring property.97 In that
situation, the property owners can observe the nature of the risk
far more readily than a government agency, which lacks the
personnel to inspect every tree. A regulatory system for cutting
down trees would “sometimes be too restrictive” and would
“impos[e] needless precautions.”98 If the owner of the tree
unreasonably ignores the risk and the tree causes damage to the
neighboring property, tort provides a viable remedy.99 On the
other hand, where governmental actors know more about the
true nature or degree of risk (such as the risk from radioactive
materials), public regulation is preferable because agencies have
“better access to, or a superior ability to evaluate, relevant
medical, epidemiological, and ecological knowledge.”100
The second factor is whether private parties are capable of
paying for the full magnitude of harm done.101 If a private party
can cause damage in an amount that exceeds its assets, then its
motivation to reduce risk is weakened: it may simply declare
bankruptcy in the case of excess liability.102 According to

95. Id. at 359–64.
96. Id. at 364–65.
97. Id. at 366–67.
98. Id. at 367.
99. Id. at 359.
100. Id. at 369.
101. Id.
102. Michael G. Faure, In the Aftermath of the Disaster, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 95, 112
(2016) (“The insolvency problem will obviously arise in all cases where smaller operators
may also cause high damage whose potential magnitude may outweigh their personal
assets.”).
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Shavell, some form of ex ante regulation to reduce risk is
appropriate under these circumstances.103
The third factor identified by Shavell is whether parties
might escape the threat of suit for harm done. Where harm is
spread across hundreds or even thousands of people, each
individual lacks concentrated injury and therefore incentive to
sue. In many cases, the harm may be so diffuse that the injured
individuals may not even be aware that they have been
harmed.104 In such situations, tort law is unlikely to provide
accountability
for
the
risk-producing
firm
or
its
decisionmakers.105 On the other hand, in circumstances where
risk-producing firms can readily be held liable for harms that
they cause through tortious behavior, private law provides a
deterrent incentive.106
Finally, Shavell’s fourth factor is the administrative costs
imposed on society from managing the risk.107 Public law
approaches, grounded in regulation, inspection, and
enforcement, put far more of a financial burden on taxpayers
than private law approaches, and that burden must be incurred
whether or not the regulated facility is creating any harm. The
higher governmental costs of regulation may be unjustifiable for
categories of risk that can be handled adequately through a
liability regime. On the other hand, these administrative costs
may be necessary for some types of risk for which private law
tort remedies are inadequately protective (such as controlling
air pollution or other kinds of diffuse harms). Shavell suggests
that a cost-benefit analysis should be employed to compare
private and public law risk management tools in any given
circumstance.108
Together, Shavell’s four factors suggest that when a risk of
harm to the public comes from thousands of actors, but the
actual harm (when it occurs) is traceable to one or a small
number of actors, we should opt for ex post private remedies
such as tort law, given the limited ability of the administrative
103. Shavell, supra note 13, at 361.
104. Id. at 363.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 363.
108. Id. at 364.
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state to monitor, inspect, and regulate thousands of firms on an
ex ante basis. On the other hand, a public law regulatory regime
is appropriate where firms create diffuse risks of harm to the
public, individuals harmed by an activity may not know that
they are being harmed, experts have better information about
the full magnitude of risk than members of the public, and
private parties may not have assets to cover damage claims if
injury occurs. In those circumstances, any deterrent incentive
from tort law is weakened and an ex ante regulatory approach
is preferable.
B. Weaknesses of Private Law as an Approach to Toxic
Floodwaters Risks
How should Shavell’s four considerations apply in the
particular context of harms from toxic floodwaters? Toxic
floodwaters is a category of harm where (1) the magnitude of
harm from the escape of hazardous substances during flood
events can be greater than the assets of the risk-producing firms,
and (2) the harm is diffuse and difficult to trace back to its
source. Because firms under these conditions may not face
liability for the harms they cause, private law is not likely to be
effective in managing the problem. A public law regulatory
regime is preferable to prevent releases and manage the risk, as
long as it can be implemented at reasonable cost.
For decades, however, the United States has relied primarily
on private law to prevent toxic floodwaters incidents. There are
few federal or state standards governing industrial chemical
storage.109 There are no mandatory standards governing storage
tank performance, inspections, record-keeping, or setback
requirements from waterways, and there are no FEMA
regulations governing chemical storage in floodplains.110 The
result of this lax regulation is that private firms, storing millions
of gallons of hazardous substances near waterways, operate
without regulatory oversight of their storage practices or their
flood preparedness.

109. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 112.1–112.21 (2019) (oil tank regulations).
110. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.400 (2019) (FEMA minimum standards); 44 C.F.R. pts. 59, 60
(2019) (National Flood Insurance Program standards).
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Making the case for continued reliance on private law,
industry executives have argued that no new regulatory regimes
are needed because firms have voluntary programs in place to
prevent accidental releases during flood events.111 Moreover,
industry executives contend that no new regulatory regimes are
needed because firms are subject to safety mandates from their
own insurance carriers.112
Scholars have made similar arguments about the superiority
of private law for managing many types of disaster risks to
industry. Michael Faure, for example, has argued that liability
rules provide adequate incentives for disaster prevention:
By exposing them to the costs of their activities via
liability rules, parties will be given appropriate
incentives for taking optimal care to prevent accidents.
Since it is the level of care that minimizes the costs of
prevention and the expected damage costs, taking
optimal care would reduce the total social costs of
accidents. This basic insight can apply to the damage
resulting from disasters as well: the exposure of the risk
taker to liability provides incentives for disaster
mitigation.113

111. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Chem. Council, Statement by ACC President and
CEO Cal Dooley in Response to Hurricane Harvey (Aug. 31, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/D96W-KK8F (highlighting the ACC’s voluntary Responsible Care
initiative and citing the industry’s “comprehensive and well-rehearsed emergency
plans”). See also Comments of Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. on Docket ID No. EPAHQ-OLEM-2018-0024 (Aug. 24, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/Z6K5-7C98;
Comments of Nat’l Mining Assoc. on Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OLEM-2018-0024 (Aug. 24,
2018), available at https://perma.cc/NV96-S9C8; Comments of Am. Chem. Council on
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OLEM-2018-0024 (Aug. 24, 2018), available at
https://perma.cc/P8DZ-Q9FE; Comments of Soc’y of Chem. Mfrs. & Affiliates on Docket
ID No. EPA-HQ-OLEM-2018-0024 (Aug. 23, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/8C6P6DPW.
112. Alexander H. Tullo, Bracing for Climate Change, the Chemical Industry Learns
from Hurricane Harvey, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Feb. 10, 2020), available at
https://perma.cc/EQ8U-A4RX.
113. Faure, supra note 102, at 105 (promoting use of liability rules for disaster risk
management and discussing the conditions under which these rules can be effective).
See also Arnold, supra note 11, at 259 (criticizing public law regulatory strategies and
advocating an approach to disaster risk management grounded in liability and financial
assurance mechanisms).
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These arguments for continued reliance on private law ring
hollow, however, when viewed against Shavell’s four-factor
framework and the clear weaknesses of private law in managing
diffuse risks. In the case of toxic floodwaters, private law
approaches are unlikely to provide an adequate deterrent for
firms because once chemicals mix with floodwaters and the
contamination spreads, it becomes difficult to trace the harm
back to any particular source. Individuals may not know they
have been exposed to harmful chemicals, nor would they likely
be able to identify the source of these chemicals. Consequently,
tort law is unlikely to provide either a remedy for injured
individuals or deterrence.114 Below, I present further reasons
why the decentralized mechanisms of tort liability, profit
incentives, and insurance will underprotect communities.
1. Tort Liability
There is a long-running scholarly debate about the role of
tort law in addressing environmental, health, and safety
risks.115 Many scholars contend that tort doctrine, which
evolved to address discrete bodily injury to an individual
plaintiff, is ill-suited for managing widespread, diffuse harms
to public health and the environment. As Chris Schroeder has
explained:
For many environmental risks the ability of tort to
prevent harm will depend entirely on the success of its
deterrent effect, which must inevitably be an indirect
effect of the signal or message that the tort system sends.
It is not enough that tort cases send a message, either.
That message must be heard, understood, and acted upon
before deterrence succeeds.
These downstream
114. See Note, Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 2256 (2015); Katalin Sulyok, Managing Uncertain Causation in Toxic Exposure
Cases: Lessons for the European Court of Human Rights from U.S. Toxic Tort Litigation,
18 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 520 (2017); Lazarus, supra note 21, at 1031.
115. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic Activity: An
Empirical Analysis of Tort Reform's Impact on Businesses, Employment, and Production,
66 VAND. L. REV. 255, 281-84 (2013); Adam D. K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an
Environmental Policy Instrument, 92 OR. L. REV. 381 (2013); DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF
& MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS
SERIOUSLY (1996).
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components to the mechanism of deterrence depend on
individuals, incentive structures and institutions that
tort cannot affect directly.116
There are many reasons why owners and managers of firms
do not invest in appropriate safety precautions even when they
face a clear prospect of liability in the event of an accident; these
include over-optimism, short planning horizons, and the liability
protections of the corporate form.117 In the specific context of
toxic floodwaters, the threat of tort liability is unlikely to provide
a strong deterrent signal because after massive flooding events,
the effects of chemical exposure may not manifest for years. The
more time between cause and effect, the more difficult it becomes
to obtain evidence and prove causation, and the greater
possibility that responsible parties will be judgment-proof when
plaintiffs file suit. Consequently, few tort suits over floodrelated chemical releases are likely to succeed, even in
communities that have experienced widespread contamination.
Fundamentally, tort law is not well-suited to address this kind
of disaster. As Doug Kysar has noted, tort law is primarily
aimed at “settling matters of right and responsibility within a
particular, localised relationship. The possibility for incomplete
and inconsistent judgments is therefore rife within the use of
tort law to serve environmental, health, and safety objectives.”118
A further hurdle to reliance on private law mechanisms is
that in most states, storage of oil or other hazardous chemicals
is not considered an “abnormally dangerous” activity that would
trigger strict liability in tort.119 Consequently, holding firms
accountable for chemical releases requires a plaintiff to prove
the negligence of the facility owner or operator. But there are
enormous evidentiary hurdles for a plaintiff to show that a firm
fell below a standard of reasonable care in how it stored or
managed hazardous substances during an extreme weather
event. Such a tort suit would require that the plaintiff not only
116. Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in Translation: What Environmental Regulation
Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 591 (2002).
117. Id. at 592.
118. Douglas Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation
Mechanism, 9 EUR. J.RISK REG. 48 (2018).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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trace their injuries back to the source of the contamination, but
also document unreasonably dangerous conditions that existed
inside the facility before and during the flood that led to a
chemical release. The plaintiff would have to prove that the
firm’s chemical storage policies or practices were unreasonably
lax. Of course, in many cases, the facility would be so damaged
by flooding as to preclude gathering that kind of proof during
discovery.120
Finally, the strongest argument against continuing to rely on
a private law risk management regime is simply that it has not
worked in the past. The threat of tort suits has not prompted
industry to invest in measures to prevent weather-related
chemical releases, such as elevating chemical storage tanks or
building secondary containment systems. Further, the handful
of tort suits that have been filed, alleging injury from chemical
releases during extreme weather events, have failed.121 Courts
have rejected arguments that firms knew or should have known
about potential dangers from flooding and therefore had a duty
to secure their facilities.122
The suddenness of weather
emergencies (as well as defendants’ portrayal of them as force
majeure events) undercut plaintiffs’ arguments that a defendant
should have known about the danger.123 Tort plaintiffs also have
difficulty proving that the defendant failed to use ordinary or
120. See Faure, supra note 102, at 112 (noting that “[p]rivate parties may in some
cases lack adequate information on preventive technology” that could have been used by
the risk-creating enterprise to avoid the disaster).
121. Dena Adler, Turning the Tide in Coastal and Riverine Energy Infrastructure
Adaptation: Can an Emerging Wave of Litigation Advance Preparation for Climate
Change?, 4 OIL & GAS, NAT. RESOURCE & ENERGY J. 519 (2018) (noting weaknesses of
“failure to adapt” lawsuits against energy infrastructure owners and arguing that
facilities are often shielded from civil liability by weak permits); Peel & Osofsky, supra
note 4, at 2179-80 (2015) (analyzing suits alleging that firms have failed to take
reasonable steps to adapt to climate change and arguing that Australia offers a more
promising model for these suits than the U.S.); Jenna Shweitzer, Climate Change Legal
Remedies: Hurricane Sandy and New York City Coastal Adaptation, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L.
243, 290 (2014) (examining cases against New York City for failure to adapt to climate
change and arguing that these cases are not likely to succeed).
122. Adler, supra note 121.
123. Arkema Chemicals, for example, defended its work to secure chemicals before the
arrival of Hurricane Harvey by emphasizing that the flooding during Harvey was
“unprecedented.” Stephanie Ebbs, Noxious Chemical Fire During Hurricane Harvey
Caused by Failure of “All Levels of Protection,” Probe Reveals, ABC NEWS, (May 25,
2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/noxious-chemical-fire-hurricane-harvey-causedfailurelayers/story?id=55410407.
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customary care, given the widespread damage that storms cause
throughout communities.124 If hundreds of firms experience
chemical releases during extreme weather, then it is difficult to
show that a particular defendant’s level of care with respect to
its own hazardous substances was uncustomarily lax. Instead,
a level of care that resulted in the release of hazardous
substances would appear to be the industry standard in the
wake of a major storm. For this reason, we should not let
industry custom be the sole measuring stick for the appropriate
level of care with respect to storage and management of
hazardous substances.
2. Profit Incentives
If the tort system is unlikely to incentivize prevention of
chemical releases during floods, what about firms’ profit
incentive to maintain control of their inventory and protect their
own property? Here too, private incentives, standing alone, are
unlikely to lead firms to undertake necessary preventive
measures. To be sure, firms have a profit motive to prevent
valuable chemicals or fuel from escaping from facilities. Such
releases involve loss of valuable inventory and potential
contamination of the facility itself, leading to prolonged plant
closures. In theory, firms in a competitive market should be
seeking cost-effective solutions to prevent flood-related chemical
releases.
Despite these market incentives, firms’ level of safety
investment is likely to be suboptimal if there is no accountability
for the mass contamination events that can result when
hazardous substances escape. Firms will undertake riskreducing measures to protect their own property, but only up to
the point where the cost of precautionary measures equals the
expected cost to the firm of future potential property damage.
The cost to the surrounding communities from their operations
does not enter into the equation. Industrial chemical releases
during extreme weather events, in other words, present an
externality problem not easily remedied through the market.125
124. Shweitzer, supra note 121, at 290.
125. See Hudson, supra note 10, at 1138 (criticizing land development policies,
especially those that encourage development in flood plains, and arguing that “[w]hile

46CJEL_SACHS_73 (DO NOT DELETE)

104

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

2/5/2021 2:19 PM

[Vol. 46:1

3. Insurance Incentives
Advocates of the status quo, perhaps recognizing these
weaknesses of tort law and profit incentives, nonetheless
continue to argue against new regulation by emphasizing the
role of insurance in preventing chemical releases.126 They argue
that insurers can incentivize firms to take ex ante measures to
prevent flood-related toxic releases, without the need for
burdensome government regulations.
To be sure, insurance plays a vital role in managing flood
risk, but it is far from a comprehensive solution to the
externality problem from toxic floodwaters.
First-party
insurance can, of course, help firms manage the risk of extreme
weather to their own enterprises.127 But it is important to
distinguish such insurance from liability insurance, which
would insure companies against third-party claims brought by
individuals or businesses harmed by chemical releases. Most
flood insurance is first-party insurance that is not designed to
compensate injured individuals off-site.128
Insurance should not be the primary tool for preventing toxic
chemical releases for several additional reasons. Small firms
have little incentive to purchase liability insurance coverage
that is greater than the firm’s assets, even if the potential
damage from chemical releases far exceeds the value of the
firm’s assets.129 For larger firms, purchasing liability insurance
will not lead to risk-reducing measures unless the insurer
closely verifies each firm’s efforts to reduce risk and lowers
premiums for firms that take risk-reducing measures.130
Furthermore, liability insurance markets will not operate
efficiently to reduce risk if there are few examples of successful
the landowner bears the full benefit of their economic decision, it is society that
collectively bears the incremental environmental harms caused by a collection of
property owners converting their land from natural capital to the built environment”).
126. Arnold, supra note 11.
127. Jeffrey O’Connell & John Linehan, Neo No-Fault Early Offers: A Workable
Compromise Between First and Third-Party Insurance, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 103, 105
(2005) (exploring the differences between first- and third-party insurance).
128. Saul J. Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood Insurance
Program and the “Takings” Clause, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 328 (1990).
129. Shavell, supra note 13, at 361.
130. Robert H. Jerry II, Managing Hurricane (and Other Natural Disaster) Risk, 6
TEX. A&M L. REV. 391, 410 (2019).
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liability lawsuits involving flood-related chemical releases. If
tort suits are not a significant threat to insureds, then liability
insurance covering these claims will be cheap to obtain, and
some firms may decide to forego liability insurance coverage for
offsite releases altogether, given the low litigation risk.131
Finally, as a practical matter, liability insurance that would
cover chemical releases due to flooding is not readily available
in the marketplace.132 Many liability policies exclude coverage
for hazardous substance releases, claims related to flooding, and
force majeure events.133
For all of these reasons, private law is likely to lead to
suboptimal risk outcomes for toxic floodwaters incidents.134 Tort
liability cannot sufficiently deter facilities from risky chemical
storage practices because of the nature of toxic floodwater
incidents and the many obstacles to bringing a successful suit.
Insurance, while providing some ex ante incentive to enact safety
measures and adopt emergency plans, cannot alone incentivize
firms to prevent flood-related chemical releases. The existing
private law regime for toxic floodwater risk underprotects
adjacent communities and leaves injured individuals without a
viable remedy for damages.
Next, I turn to some promising public law approaches for
preventing toxic floodwaters. In examining regulatory options,
it is important to recognize that public law should supplement,
rather than supplant, the existing private law regime for toxic
floodwaters.
In other words, federal or state regulatory
standards governing chemical and oil storage and spill
prevention should not preempt or preclude the possibility of
state tort suits over chemical or oil releases in the wake of major
storms. Firms that comply with applicable regulations on
chemical or oil storage should not be shielded from private
131. For this same reason, proposals to mandate that firms in coastal industries
purchase insurance or surety bonds to cover disaster risks—so-called financial
assurance mandates—are unlikely to offer much risk-reduction benefit. See Arnold,
supra note 11.
132. JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y INST. COASTAL DISASTER INSURANCE
IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL WARMING, (2007); Jerry, supra note 130, at 427.
133. Id. at 427–28.
134. See Faure, supra note 102, at 114 (although liability rules “can provide
incentives for disaster risk mitigation, in practice the impact of liability rules may not
be that large. Due to high barriers to entry, the liability regime may turn out to be
merely an ad hoc system available to only a small percentage of accident victims.”).
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lawsuits for injuries. The reasons for not recognizing such a
regulatory compliance defense, in the specific context of toxic
floodwaters, parallel the reasons why courts have rejected the
defense in other areas of tort law.135 These considerations
include federalism, efficiency, and the fact that regulatory
standards, though important for preventing harm to the public,
do not compensate individuals and businesses when harm
occurs. Therefore, the analysis that follows should not be
interpreted as negating any role for tort law as a response to
toxic floodwaters incidents.
IV.

HARNESSING PUBLIC LAW TO STRENGTHEN THE CHEMICAL
SAFETY REGIME

The United States has more than a dozen major statutes that
address discharges of toxic substances to the environment,136 yet
there are significant gaps in the chemical regulatory regime that
leave communities vulnerable to toxic floodwaters. Existing
statutes, for example, do not limit where industrial facilities can
be sited. Instead, through permitting regimes, existing statutes
regulate facilities’ discharges of pollutants into air and water
from whatever location they are sited. These statutes poorly
regulate risks from the storage of toxic chemicals, even where
such storage could lead to widespread chemical releases in the
event of a natural disaster. Although there is a yawning
regulatory gap at the federal level, only fourteen states have

135. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance,
88 GEO. L J. 2049 (2000); Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort
Law: The Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2000); Mark A.
Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2014); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“[c]ompliance with a legislative
enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence
where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PROD. LIABILITY § 4(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“[A] product’s compliance with
an applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation . . . does not preclude
as a matter of law a finding of product defect.”).
136. See, e.g.. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1990); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a) (1995); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-27 (2016); Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (1960); Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 112 Stat. 3016 (2008).
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enacted laws governing the conditions of chemical storage.137
Given this longstanding regulatory weakness, new legislation
(or, in some cases, new regulation) is needed to reduce the risk
that industrial facilities will release hazardous substances
during major floods.
The gaps in the existing chemical regulatory regime make
little sense from the standpoint of risk management. The
regulations for the 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), for example, contain extensive requirements for the
handling, labeling, and storage of hazardous waste.138 RCRA
applies, however, solely to actual wastes (i.e. substances that
firms intend to discard),139 not to useful chemicals intended for
sale or as inputs to manufacturing processes.140
But
commercially useful chemicals, if they escape into the
environment, can be just as harmful to human health as
hazardous waste.141
Federal law also has extensive
requirements for the storage of oil in tanks,142 including a
requirement that tank owners draft and implement spill
prevention plans,143 but there are no similar requirements for

137. Clean Water Act Hazardous Substances Spill Prevention, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,499,
29510 n.18 (Jun. 25, 2018). See also Judd Schechtman, NYU Tandon Sch. of Eng’g,
Presentation at the National Working Waterfront Symposium: Toxic Storm: The
Challenge and Solutions to Hazardous Materials in Industrial Floodplains, (2015)
(discussing state laws aimed at preventing toxic contamination from flooding).
138. 40 C.F.R. § 265.51(a) (2018) (requiring facilities which produce, handle, or dispose
of hazardous waste to develop contingency plans that “minimize hazards to human
health or the environment from fires, explosions, or any unplanned sudden or nonsudden release of hazardous waste or hazardous waste constituents to air, soil, or surface
water”).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2014) (definition of solid waste).
140. Clean Water Act Hazardous Substances Spill Prevention, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,499,
29506-10 (Jun. 25, 2018) (summarizing federal regulations that are relevant to chemical
storage and releases).
141. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), for example, has
identified 120 agents as known carcinogens, including commonly used industrial
chemicals such as benzene, trichlorethylene, and vinyl chloride.
The IARC has
identified 88 additional agents as probable human carcinogens. See Agents Classified by
the IARC Monographs, Volumes 1-128, INTL. AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER,
available at https://perma.cc/Y56R-RZWF (last accessed Oct. 23, 2020). See also Known
and Probable Human Carcinogens, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, available at
https://perma.cc/2ZQS-SKPX (last accessed Oct. 13, 2020).
142. 40 C.F.R. pt. 112 (2002).
143. Id.
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the storage of hazardous substances other than oil.144 Federal
law does authorize civil and criminal penalties for unpermitted
releases of both oil and hazardous substances into water,145 but
violations of these statutes have rarely led to substantial
penalties in the wake of mass flooding events.146
As a first step toward a stronger regulatory regime,
policymakers should compile an inventory of flood-exposed
facilities that store oil and hazardous chemicals—as well as
flood-exposed sewage treatment plants—to identify the most
dangerous facilities. Regulators may already be aware of some
“at-risk” facilities if the facilities are subject to federal or state
permitting for other reasons (e.g., they are a “major source” for
air permitting purposes).147 But many hazardous chemical
storage facilities (e.g., warehouses, retailers, liquid storage
terminals) are not subject to any ongoing environmental
permitting or regular inspections because they do not discharge
pollutants to the environment in the ordinary course of their
business.148 Depending on their location, such facilities may
need to be added to the inventory of flood-exposed industrial
facilities and should be subject to regular inspection.
144. Another unjustified regulatory gap is that RCRA heavily regulates underground
storage tanks (USTs) that store hazardous chemicals, but there are no similar
requirements for tanks that store hazardous substances aboveground. USTs must meet
a number of technical standards, and owners maintain financial responsibility in the
event of a spill. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 280; EPA, Learn About Underground Storage Tanks
(USTs), https://perma.cc/PHH6-SNFF (last accessed Oct. 14, 2020); DEF. LOGISTICS
AGENCY, DLA ENERGY ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDE FOR FUEL FACILITIES, ch. 3.2–3.3 (2019).
The federal regulations for USTs also dictate appropriate filling practices, owner and
operator training, leak detection procedures, and reporting requirements. Id.
145. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995) (prohibiting discharge of
pollutants without a permit); 40 C.F.R. § 112.1 (2011) (requiring preparation of spill
prevention, control, and countermeasure plans for certain facilities that store oil).
146. For an example of enforcement actions to flood-related toxic releases, see Lise
Olsen, A Year Later, Texas Regulators Start to Act Against Harvey’s Polluters, HOUS.
CHRON. (Aug. 31, 2018, 4:08 PM), available at https://perma.cc/7FNE-XADG. See also
David Grunfield, Stolthaven Fined $12,000 for Failing to Quickly Report Chemical
Release Following Hurricane Isaac, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sep. 19, 2012), available at
https://www.nola.com/news/weather/article_1338ec4e-8b54-5332-b5a3f281c5b36365.html.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (1977).
148. Warehouses and other storage locations are obligated to provide an annual
inventory of the hazardous chemicals on site, pursuant to the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 11022 (2018). But EPCRA is a
disclosure statute with few substantive requirements governing the conditions of
chemical storage. See infra Part IV(B).
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Once the inventory process is underway, policymakers
should take three additional steps to prevent industrial chemical
releases: (1) establish federal standards for chemical storage
and spill prevention; (2) reform outdated emergency planning
and notification requirements; and (3) prohibit the construction
of new industrial facilities in flood-exposed areas.
A. Establishing Standards for Chemical Storage and Spill
Prevention
While the United States has comprehensive performance
and monitoring standards for aboveground oil tanks to prevent
oil spills,149 one of the largest gaps in the existing chemical
regulatory regime is the lack of any regulatory standards for
aboveground storage of hazardous substances other than oil. No
federal regulations mandate that hazardous substances be kept
in suitable, flood-proof storage tanks and no federal regulations
mandate chemical tank inspection, leak detection, corrosion
prevention, or secondary containment measures. With sparse
regulatory oversight, firms can continue to store extremely toxic
substances in aging containers, indoors or outdoors, within just
a few feet of waterways prone to flooding.150 It is unconscionable
that the federal government has not promulgated regulatory
standards for storage of hazardous chemicals in aboveground
tanks, especially since the risk to human health is, in many
cases, far greater from the industrial chemicals left unregulated
than it is from oil.151
The failure to enact these standards is glaring because the
1972 Clean Water Act mandated that EPA establish storage and
spill prevention standards for oil and other hazardous
substances.152 Within a year, EPA promulgated regulatory
149. 40 C.F.R. pt. 112 (2002).
150. The aging of existing chemical storage tanks is a serious and overlooked problem.
West Virginia, one of the few states to enact legislation regulating aboveground chemical
storage, has reported that more than 25% of the chemical storage tanks in the state are
more than 30 years old. W. VA. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., AST Registration Graphical
Information, available at https://perma.cc/3JSM-F8QS (last accessed Oct. 13, 2020).
151. IARC, supra note 141.
152. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(1)(C) (2018) (“[T]he President shall issue regulations . . .
establishing procedures, methods, and equipment and other requirements for equipment
to prevent discharges of oil and hazardous substances from vessels and from onshore
facilities and offshore facilities, and to contain such discharges.”).
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standards for storage of oil.153 Nearly fifty years after the Clean
Water Act’s enactment, however, EPA has failed to promulgate
similar safety standards for the storage of other hazardous
substances. This inordinate delay (and abdication of regulatory
responsibility) helps to explain why industry is unprepared for
the challenges of preventing weather-related chemical releases.
A comprehensive federal regulatory program focusing on
containment, preparedness, and spill prevention simply never
got off the ground.
In 2015, several environmental groups sued EPA to compel
it to issue regulations for hazardous substances required by the
Clean Water Act. As a result, EPA agreed to a 2016 consent
decree that required the agency to begin the rulemaking process
addressing hazardous substances.154
Once the Trump
Administration took office, however, EPA concluded that no new
regulation was necessary.155 In EPA’s view, other federal
regulatory programs were effective in preventing and
responding to hazardous substance spills, and any new
regulation on this issue would be superfluous.156
EPA’s conclusion was plagued by both legal and factual
inaccuracies.157 Significantly, EPA ignored the clear command
of the Clean Water Act that EPA “shall issue regulations”
governing storage of hazardous substances and prevention of
153. 38 Fed. Reg. 34,165 (Dec. 11, 1973). Under the Clean Water Act, facilities that
store large quantities of oil (above 1,320 gallons) above or below ground must take
measures to prevent, prepare for, and respond to accidental discharges of oil and must
prepare a Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) plan. The largest oil
storage facilities (above 1 million gallons) must prepare a more detailed Facility
Response Plan (FRP) that includes planning for worst-case oil discharges. 40 C.F.R. pt.
112 (2002).
154. Envtl. Justice Health Alliance for Chem. Policy Reform v. EPA, 15-cv-5705
(S.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2015).
155. 84 Fed. Reg. 46,100 (Sep. 3, 2019).
156. Id.
157. One crucial factual inaccuracy is that EPA, relying on spill data from the
National Response Center (NRC), asserted that few hazardous substance spills have
occurred in the United States. The NRC, however, relies on self-reporting, and it is
widely believed to underestimate the true number of spills. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, CLEAN WATER: BETTER INFORMATION AND TARGETED PREVENTION EFFORTS
COULD ENHANCE SPILL MANAGEMENT IN THE ST. CLAIR-DETROIT RIVER CORRIDOR 11
(2006). In a prior rulemaking, EPA said that National Response Center data should be
understood to “represent the minimum number of spills” because “it is likely that [the
NRC] greatly underestimate[s] the actual number of spills because of significant
underreporting.” 62 Fed. Reg. 54,508, 54,527 (Oct. 20, 1997).
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accidental discharge.158 When Congress has delegated authority
to an agency to decide whether regulatory action is necessary (or
is instead superfluous given other regulatory action), Congress
has made this intent clear with plain language.159 Under the
Clean Water Act, however, Congress used plain language to
indicate the opposite: EPA does not have such discretion.
Even if EPA did have the authority to determine that
existing regulations can take the place of regulatory standards
for hazardous substance storage under the Clean Water Act, its
own analysis shows that the coverage of the other regulations is
partial, at best.160 The other regulations for hazardous
substances discussed by EPA are nowhere near as
comprehensive as EPA’s oil spill rules, nor do they address the
same risks that comprehensive hazardous substance spill
regulations would cover.161
Enacting hazardous substance spill prevention regulations
under the Clean Water Act is the most important regulatory step
that EPA could take to manage toxic floodwater risk without
new Congressional authority. EPA could set performance,
construction, and leak detection requirements for chemical
storage tanks and could require facilities that store chemicals
above a certain volume threshold to prepare spill prevention and
response plans. New regulations could specify siting and
construction standards to limit flood risk, including standards
that would require elevating any chemical storage tanks in flood
zones.
However, promulgating these Clean Water Act regulations
would not be a panacea for the toxic floodwaters problem. If EPA
enacts such regulations, they would apply only to the 330

158. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(1)(C) (2018). The statute says that “the President” shall issue
these regulations, and that authority was delegated to EPA in 1973. Exec. Order No.
11,735 § 1(4) (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 21,243 (Aug. 7, 1973).
159. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (2018) (requiring EPA to “take into account…the
extent to which effective control is being or may be achieved under other regulatory
authority” before issuing effluent standards for companies’ intentional discharge of toxic
pollutants under the Clean Water Act).
160. 84 Fed. Reg. 46,100, 46,102 (Sep 3, 2019).
161. See Letter from 55 Groups Opposed to EPA’s Do-Nothing Chemical Spill Plan,
RE: Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OLEM-2018-0024, Clean Water Act Hazardous Substance
Spill Prevention Action (Aug. 24, 2018) (explaining differences between coverage of other
regulations and the required regulations under the Clean Water Act).
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chemicals that EPA has designated as “hazardous substances”
under the Clean Water Act.162 EPA originally created the
hazardous substances list in 1978 and has not updated it in
decades.163 That short list is a far cry from the 30,000 chemicals
commonly used in commercial applications in the United
States.164 To ensure that a fuller suite of chemicals is covered
by hazardous substance spill prevention regulations, EPA will
have to go through the rulemaking process to expand the list, or
the states will have to supplement any EPA action with
expanded, state-promulgated lists of hazardous chemicals.165
B. Reforms to Emergency Planning and Notification
The second component of a more robust regulatory regime is
strengthening the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act (EPCRA)166 by adding substantive provisions
on chemical storage and spill prevention. EPCRA is the
principal federal law designed to promote emergency planning
by communities and public access to industry information on
chemical storage and releases. Since its enactment, however,
EPCRA has been a paper tiger, underfunded and
underenforced.167
EPCRA operates through disclosure requirements, rather
than substantive mandates to the industries subject to the
162. 40 C.F.R. § 116.4 (Jul. 1, 2011).
163. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,474 (Mar. 13, 1978).
164. APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 14, at 25.
165. The states that have enacted their own legislation on the threat of chemical
releases have largely focused on one sub-issue: protecting coal ash pits from flooding.
These pits are commonly located near coal-burning power plants and along waterways.
See, e.g, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 130A-309.200-239 (2014); Coal Ash Pollution Prevention Act,
S.B. 0009, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2019); Illinois House and Senate Pass
Landmark Decision to Clean Up Coal Ash, EARTHJUSTICE (May 28, 2019), available at
https://perma.cc/BA3L-HZWE.
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11005 (1986).
167. See Danielle Purifoy, EPCRA: A Retrospective on the Environmental Right-toKnow Act, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 375, 401 (2013) (noting that Local
Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs)—committees required by EPCRA to create
emergency plans and keep the public informed of chemical hazards—are “largely an
unfunded mandate,” and they are “in constant competition for the few federal grants
available for emergency planning….”); Lamdan & Bratspies, supra note 11, at 599
(“studies show that LEPCs often fail to provide public notice about their activities and
meetings, and they do not receive public inquiries, as most of the public does not even
know that LEPCs exist.”).
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statute. Each year, firms must disclose to state and local officials
an inventory of the amounts and names of toxic chemicals being
stored on site.168 The chemicals subject to this inventory
reporting include substances such as heavy metals, corrosive
acids, ammonia, and petroleum products.169 EPCRA also
requires annual reporting of releases of toxic chemicals to the
air, water, and land (the so-called Toxic Release Inventory, or
TRI).170 This TRI reporting principally applies to chemicals that
have been legally discharged to the environment under state and
federal permits.171
The theory behind EPCRA is that information disclosure will
help communities make sound decisions about disaster
prevention and assist first responders in emergency situations.
But EPCRA performs poorly even with respect to this limited
aim. There is a broken link between the disclosure of chemical
storage inventory data that may indicate a potential risk to
waterways or communities and the ability of regulators to do
anything about the problem. Moreover, while many states make
industry TRI information readily available on websites, most do
not make the chemical inventory forms public, often citing the
risk that publicizing the data will lead to terrorist attacks on
industrial plants.172 However, inventory forms are the crucial
information that the public needs to determine which chemicals
are being stored at facilities. The inventory forms are directly
relevant for preparing for, and responding to, toxic floodwaters
incidents. They contain the crucial data on chemical hazards
that would be needed in flooding scenarios, yet citizens do not

168. 42 U.S.C. §11022 (2018).
169. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 355.
170. 42 U.S.C. §11024.
171. Rebecca S. Weeks, The Bumpy Road to Community Preparedness: The Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to Know Act, 4 ENVTL. L. 827, 845-48 (1998).
172. See, e.g., Jim Morris & Joe Wertz, A Common Fertilizer Can Cause Explosions.
Uneven Regulation Puts People at Risk. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 29, 2020),
available at https://perma.cc/2V5S-JPAV (discussing the Texas Attorney General’s
determination that chemical inventory forms should not be released because of a state
law that limits release of information “more than likely to assist in the construction
or assembly of an explosive weapon or a chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear weapon of mass destruction”). See also Trevor Bossi, “Hey, What Chemicals
Do You Have in There?” Homeland Security and Right-to-Know Laws Clash in
Texas, 9 H OUS . L. REV .: OFF THE REC . 129 (2019).
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have access to them in many jurisdictions, despite the “right to
know” intent of the federal legislation.173
State and local regulators do have access to these chemical
inventory forms (when firms choose to submit them), but their
receipt of the data rarely triggers any risk reduction measures
or regulatory response. EPCRA mandates only disclosure of the
bare facts of chemical storage. The statute
provides no
authority for officials to check whether reported hazardous
substances are stored properly at a facility, nor does it provide
authority to inspect or determine the age of storage tanks.174
Few states have filled this gap by giving state regulators such
authority under state law.175
EPCRA prioritizes industry autonomy, not community
safety. A warehouse storing tools in a populated area, for
instance, could switch to storing hazardous pesticides without
notifying neighbors and without confronting any substantive
standards for protecting the warehouse from flooding or other
extreme weather.176 True, the warehouse would ultimately have
to disclose to regulators (but not neighbors) that it is storing
pesticides, but because EPCRA requires these annual
disclosures to be made by March 1 of each year regulators and
first responders may not become aware of the storage of these
pesticides during the prior calendar year for more than twelve
months.
That lag-time in disclosure would very likely
encompass a hurricane season.
In short, industry’s autonomy to bring hazardous chemicals
on site remains sacrosanct, even if the decisions put nearby
173. Illinois appears to be the only state that makes the chemical inventory
information public and searchable online. See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, Chemical
Hazards in Your Backyard, TRUTHOUT (Apr. 20, 2015), available at
https://perma.cc/Y3E2-C7WG; Lamdan & Bratspies, supra note 11, at 576 (stating
“information access is a cornerstone of effective chemical disaster preparation”).
174. See Linda-Jo Schierow, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act (EPCRA): A Summary, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Apr. 5, 2012), available at
https://perma.cc/797A-DT5Q (noting the lack of substantive standards within EPCRA).
175. See Clean Water Act Hazardous Substances Spill Prevention, 83 Fed. Reg.
29,499, 29510 n.18 (Jun. 25, 2018); see also Schechtman, supra note 137.
176. By March 1 of the year following this switch in the materials stored, the
warehouse would become obligated to provide chemical inventory data disclosing the
pesticide storage to its LEPC and its state government. 42 U.S.C. § 11022 (2018).
LEPCs are notoriously underfunded, however, and an LEPC would be unlikely to take
any risk reduction measures once it was in possession of this chemical data. See Purifoy,
supra note 167, at 401.
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communities at risk. Further, EPCRA has no provisions that
would incentivize plant operators to shift to less hazardous
chemical substitutes. This is a pitiable system for protecting
communities from chemical accidents, whether flood-related or
otherwise. As Sarah Lamdan and Rebecca Bratspies have noted,
information about chemical hazards needs to be widely
distributed to the public, not just held in the files of the fire
department or other local officials:
Easy access to information about toxic chemical sites is
especially important in the aftermath of hurricanes,
floods, wildfires, and other natural disasters. In weather
disasters, people are often left to make health and safety
decisions on their own, without the ability to coordinate
with neighbors and emergency responders when the
normal routes of communication like internet access and
electrically-powered devices fail. History has shown that
when people do not know about nearby chemical hazards,
they are far more likely to be injured by chemical
releases.177
Due to Congress’s reluctance to impose any substantive
requirements on industry in 1986, EPCRA today amounts to a
paperwork exercise for industry and an unfunded mandate for
localities. Local emergency planning, when it occurs, rarely
requires firms to make changes to their facilities’ operations,
and instead focuses on emergency notification procedures and
training of first responders.178
EPCRA could become one of the major regulatory tools for
prevention of toxic floodwaters if it were amended to impose
substantive requirements regarding safe storage of toxic
chemicals, rather than shifting the burden to local authorities to
engage in emergency planning. To transform the statute into a
tool for disaster prevention, Congress should take two steps.
First, it should increase federal funding for Local Emergency
Planning Committees (LEPCs) so that these committees can
fulfill their assigned emergency-planning tasks, with robust
177. Lamdan & Bratspies, supra note 11, at 590.
178. See Purifoy, supra note 167, at 382.
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public disclosure and input. LEPCs bring together elected
officials, police and fire departments, and other first responders
to prepare and implement emergency response plans.179 The
emergency plans include identification of hazardous facilities,
responsible personnel, evacuation routes, public notification
procedures, and training and emergency response procedures.180
Most LEPCs lack a dedicated funding source to focus on
EPCRA’s chemical hazards mandate,181 and the role of LEPCs
has often expanded far beyond EPCRA's original chemical
hazards mission.182 In many jurisdictions, the LEPC is the
central local planning agency for all kinds of emergencies,
including terrorist attacks and pandemics.183
Moreover,
enforcement against industry is rare for violations, such as
failure to file inventory forms or misreporting, due to lack of
LEPC staff support.184 Adequate resources are key to EPCRA’s
functioning: if Congress will not appropriate new funding, states
should levy fees upon industry to fund robust local and state
planning for chemical emergencies.
Second, Congress should amend EPCRA to impose
construction, siting, and performance standards for storage of
hazardous chemicals above a certain volume threshold. Such
standards should apply to the thousands of chemicals subject to
inventory reporting under EPCRA, including the 366 chemicals
that EPA has designated as “extremely hazardous chemicals”
under the statute.185
Under this amendment, firms that choose to use or store
hazardous chemicals should be subject to strict requirements for
storage tank location and age, secondary containment,
inspection, and flood protection. The amendment should require
that firms elevate newly-constructed chemical storage tanks in
179. EPA, Local Emergency Planning Committees, available at https://www.epa.gov/
epcra/local-emergency-planning-committees (last accessed Jan. 2, 2021).
180. Id.
181. Purifoy, supra note 167, at 403; Llewelyn M. Engel, Note, Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know: Environmental Justice Concerns with Disclosure-Based
Laws, 6 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 117, 130 (2014).
182. Purifoy, supra note 167, at 403.
183. Id.
184. Lamdan & Bratspies, supra note 11, at 599.
185. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 355, app. A (2006) (listing EPCRA-classified extremely
hazardous substances).
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flood-exposed areas to reduce the risk of flood-related releases,
and it could put conditions on storage of designated “extremely
hazardous chemicals” in flood zones. For example, such storage
could trigger annual inspection of the storage tanks by a
professional engineer. Congress should also require that firms
post bonds or provide other financial security for large chemical
storage tanks to ensure that funds are available for clean-up,
emergency response, and damages, in the event of a catastrophic
chemical release. Under this amendment, firms would retain
their autonomy to manufacture whatever products they choose
at a given facility, but if plant owners choose to utilize hazardous
chemicals subject to EPCRA reporting, they must ensure that
operations can be conducted with a reasonable degree of safety.
To be sure, this amendment would transform EPCRA from
an information disclosure statute into one that has substantive
safety provisions for chemical storage. But this change is
warranted given that the information disclosure provisions,
standing alone, have failed to create necessary upgrades in
chemical storage standards. EPCRA prioritizes industry
autonomy over community safety. Under today’s EPCRA,
industrial facilities can store whatever chemicals they choose,
under any conditions they choose, in whatever locations they
choose, so long as, once a year, they provide an inventory of the
hazardous substances stored on-site to state and local
regulators. These minimal requirements are not fulfilling the
larger goals of EPCRA, which Congress enacted in the wake of
the deadly cyanide explosion at the Union Carbide chemical
plant in Bhopal, India.186 The purpose of the statute was to
protect communities from toxic chemical releases, not just to
inform state and local governments of the potential for releases.
It is time, therefore, for Congress to add some teeth to EPCRA
by imposing substantive safety mandates.
C. Siting Standards for New Industrial Facilities
The third component of a more robust chemical regulatory
regime is enacting zoning and siting standards that would

186. Lamdan & Bratspies, supra note 11, at 581–82.
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constrain construction of new industrial facilities that store
hazardous chemicals in flood-exposed areas. These land-use
restrictions would be controversial, but it is not feasible to
mitigate risks from toxic floodwaters without engaging with the
central issue of where hazardous facilities should be sited.
Indeed, any sensible national strategy for climate change
adaptation must involve reorienting land-use policy to reduce
disaster risks from sea level rise and flooding.
Land-use reforms should focus on newly-constructed
industrial facilities, without attempting to force unrealistic
location changes on existing plants. States and localities could
enact strict limits on where new facilities that store oil or
hazardous substances can be located, including restrictions on
construction in flood-prone areas and areas that may become
flood-prone during the expected lifetime of the planned facility.
Restricting land development is one of the most politically
fraught issues in climate adaptation. Zoning restrictions affect
local economies, housing prices, and the decisions of tens of
thousands of businesses, rather than a handful of major
polluters.187 Proposed land-use restrictions affect the interests
of developers who have already purchased land with the
expectation of developing it, creating fierce opposition.188 In
addition, channeling future industrial development away from
flood-exposed areas may result in increased costs for firms,
including longer transportation distances for raw materials and
finished products. These costs, however, would be borne by
firms (and ultimately, consumers) as the price of avoiding the
serious environmental externalities that are currently borne by
communities.
Despite these political obstacles, land-use restrictions are
essential to avoid flood-related chemical releases from industrial
facilities. Not only would such restrictions help to protect
nearby residences and businesses, but they would also protect
the stability of regional economies. Without such restrictions on
siting hazardous facilities in flood-prone areas, toxic floodwater
incidents can force businesses to shut down for extended periods,
187. Hudson, supra note 10, at 1138–39.
188. Id. at 1127 (“If you really want to see pushback from a regulated community, tell
them they cannot put a facility on a piece of property that they own and plan to develop
or lease for development.”).
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creating losses for suppliers, customers, and employees. 189
Furthermore, allowing industrial development in flood-prone
areas, including the installation of acres of asphalt and other
impervious surfaces, could exacerbate the potential for flooding
in other parts of a region.190 Addressing this problem at the
initial stages of development will make it easier to avoid future
toxic incidents.
What would appropriate land use restrictions look like?
Well-crafted regulations should prohibit siting new industrial
facilities that store hazardous substances in FEMA-designated
flood plains, areas projected to be inundated by five feet of
hurricane storm surge, and areas projected to be regularly
flooded by 2050. The prohibition should be linked to a volume
threshold for hazardous substances (e.g., applying the
prohibition only to facilities storing more than 100,000 gallons
of oil or hazardous substances on-site). Exemptions to the
prohibition should be provided for facilities that are necessarily
water-dependent (e.g., ports and shipbuilding) and must be
located near major rivers and harbors. States or localities could
use special overlay zones on zoning maps to define which floodexposed areas would be off limits to new industrial facilities.191
In an era of extreme weather, these kinds of strict
prohibitions on siting industrial facilities in flood-exposed areas
will become necessary. Past efforts to use incentives or subsidies
to channel industrial development away from flood zones have
failed. By far the largest such voluntary effort is the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established by Congress in
1968 to keep development out of high risk areas and constrict
“the development of land which is exposed to flood damage.”192

189. Meri Davlasheridze et al., Economic Impacts of Storm Surge and the Cost-Benefit
Analysis of a Coastal Spine as the Surge Mitigation Strategy in Houston-Galveston Area
in the USA, 25 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOB. CHANGE 329, 332
(2019) (“In areas with high concentrations of industrial activities . . . disruption of
strategic assets could reverberate throughout not only the local or regional economy but
may have significant economic and social implications nationwide.”).
190. Hudson, supra note 10, at 1131 (noting that the wide geographic extent of
property destruction from Hurricane Katrina was “due in no small part to the
commercial development of floodplains that both destroyed natural wetland buffer
systems and placed citizens on land at high risk of flooding”).
191. Reiblich et al., supra note 10, at 177.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (1994).

46CJEL_SACHS_73 (DO NOT DELETE)

120

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

2/5/2021 2:19 PM

[Vol. 46:1

Over five decades, however, the program has had the opposite
effect. It has facilitated the siting of buildings in high-risk zones
by offering subsidized flood insurance rates to firms that would
find private insurance to be prohibitively expensive.193
There have been multiple efforts in Congress to reform the
flood insurance program and assess actuarially appropriate
rates for insureds, based on their expected flood risk.194 These
reform efforts have failed, under intense lobbying from realtors,
the mortgage industry, and the National Association of Home
Builders.195 These same lobbying interests would likely defeat
any broad effort at the local or state level to restrict new
residential development in flood zones. Land-use restrictions
targeted at industrial facilities in flood zones—those that store
hundreds of thousands of gallons of oil or hazardous chemicals—
could see broader support, however, where the restrictions apply
only to new construction.
Regulation of land use is primarily a state and local function,
with state governments delegating zoning authority to localities
pursuant to states’ police powers.196 To date, few states have
used their power over land use to keep hazardous facilities out
of flood-exposed areas. While all coastal states —with the
exception of Alaska—have adopted coastal zone management
plans pursuant to the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act,197
the plans are primarily focused on dune and wetland protection
and erosion prevention, not on protection of the coasts from
flood-related chemical releases.198 Fourteen coastal states have
established construction setback requirements under their
plans, but the required setbacks from the ocean only range from
25 feet to 250 feet—far too short to serve as a buffer to protect
193. Hudson, supra note 10, at 1147 (the National Flood Insurance Plan “has acted as
a massive market distortion”).
194. See David Hunn, Ryan Maye Handy & James Osborne, Developing Storm: Part 2,
Build, Flood, Rebuild: Flood Insurance’s Expensive Cycle, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 9, 2017),
available at https://perma.cc/7WR4-V7M8.
195. Id.
196. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); JULIAN CONRAD
JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERT, LAND USE PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW, ch. 3.5, 3.6 (Thomson West 3d ed. 2018)
197. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (1990).
198. See CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, COASTLINE
CONSTRUCTION RESTRICTIONS, ASSEMB. 2012-R-0046 (2012), available at
https://perma.cc/Z5WV-B3RM (compiling state coastal zone restrictions).
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industrial facilities from flooding or hurricanes.199 Furthermore,
many cities continue to channel industry toward bodies of water
by designating waterfront areas as manufacturing zones on
zoning maps.200
Delaware, which is home to a large number of chemical
manufacturers, has gone the furthest in prohibiting industrial
development in coastal areas, and it offers a model for other
states facing rising seas and more frequent hurricanes. The
Delaware Coastal Zone Act of 1971201 banned new industrial
facilities in the Delaware coastal zone, which extends roughly
2 miles inland along 115 miles of coast.202 Under the statute,
then-existing industrial facilities could continue to operate at
fourteen legacy sites.203 All new industrial development was
barred from the area, with the goal of avoiding oil spills and
further chemical contamination along the coast, which is highly
valued for tourism.204 The law was amended in 2017 to allow
limited new industrial development under a permitting system
(not as-of-right) at the fourteen legacy sites, which comprise an
area that collectively represents less than 2% of Delaware’s
coastal zone.205 Even as amended by the 2017 law, the Delaware
Coastal Zone Act remains the most ambitious example of a state
using land-use law to channel industrial development away from
the coast for environmental and public health reasons.
In other coastal areas in the United States, and in inland
riparian areas prone to flooding, state and local officials should
enact similar restrictions on the siting of new industrial facilities
that use more than a specified threshold volume of oil or
hazardous materials (with certain exemptions as noted above).
If such restrictions are not enacted at the state or local level,
Congress could step in to enact land-use and siting standards for
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., New York City Zoning & Land Use Map, NYC PLANNING,
RESEARCHGATE (2018), https://www.researchgate.net/figure/New-York-Citys-Zoningand-Land-Use-Map-source-NYC-Planning-2018_fig2_334492041.
201. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 7, §§ 7001–7015 (2020).
202. Jon Hurdle, Putting Delaware’s Protected Coast Back to Work, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/6ZECKX67.
203. DEL. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., History of the Coastal Zone Act, (Oct. 13, 2020),
available at https://perma.cc/XU3B-QSPM.
204. Id.
205. Hurdle, supra note 202.
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industrial facilities storing large volumes of hazardous
substances.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has declared that regulating
land use is a “quintessential state and local power.”206
Nonetheless, as a constitutional matter, federal siting standards
for major industrial facilities would likely be upheld under the
Commerce Clause.207 As a policy matter, federal land-use
restrictions should be enacted only where state and local
governments are failing to act in the face of significant health
risks from hazardous facilities. There is ample statutory
precedent for federal involvement in determining the locations
and siting standards for major industrial facilities. For example:
•

RCRA establishes siting and construction standards for
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities (TSDFs),208 including requirements for TSDFs
located in 100-year flood plains.209

•

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission must approve the
location of new nuclear power plants.210

•

The Federal Aviation Administration must approve
siting of commercial airports.211

•

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has
exclusive authority over the siting of new import/export
terminals for natural gas.212

If Congress were to enact restrictions on the siting of
hazardous facilities in flood-exposed areas, it would not need to
206. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (citing FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982)).
207. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 542 (2012) (the Commerce power is
“expansive” and extends to intrastate activities that have a “substantial effect” on
interstate commerce). See also Catherine J. LaCroix, Land Use and Climate Change:
Is It Time for a National Land Use Policy?, 35 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 124 (2008)
(discussing benefits and drawbacks of federal involvement in land use policies).
208. 40 C.F.R. pt. 264 (1980).
209. 40 C.F.R. § 270.14(b)(11) (1983).
210. 10 C.F.R. § 50.30 (2008).
211. 14 C.F.R. § 151.21 (1970).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2005); 49 C.F.R. pt.193 (1980).
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resort to a federal permitting program akin to licensing of
airports or nuclear power plants. Rather, federal law could
simply establish flood-sensitive facility-siting standards under
which firms could build as-of-right as long as they comply with
the standards. This way, federal siting restrictions could avoid
the delays inherent in agency review of proposals for new
industrial facilities.
Such a permitting procedure would
concentrate too much discretionary power in federal agencies
and would unnecessarily trigger environmental impact review
under the National Environmental Policy Act.213
Enacting land use restrictions, as well as the standards for
chemical storage and the reforms to EPCRA that I outlined
above, would no doubt be challenging. The chemical industry
and the broader manufacturing sector present a formidable
lobbying force,214 and the sheer number of firms that could
become sources of contamination during flooding raises the
complexity and expense of any regulatory program governing
chemical storage.215 Regulating the conditions of chemical
storage at industrial plants is a more technically complex
endeavor than other kinds of climate change adaptation
measures, such as enacting residential building codes or
building irrigation systems for drought-afflicted areas.216 But
private law has proved ineffective to protect the public from this
disaster risk. As climate change exacerbates the flooding
problem, near-term political challenges should not deter
policymakers from creating a more robust chemical regulatory
regime, sensitive to climate impacts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Flood-induced chemical disasters pose a serious and
underappreciated risk to communities throughout the United
States. We have experienced many wake-up calls in recent
years, yet we have failed to act. Without an urgent and
213. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
214. The chemical industry alone spent over $43 million on lobbying in 2019. See CTR.
FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, Industry Profile: Chemical and Related Manufacturing,
available at https://perma.cc/FLP3-W2Z5.
215. Emily Atkin, America Has a Toxic Waste Hurricane Problem, NEW REPUBLIC
(Sep. 8, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/DX6M-PWF8.
216. Arnold, supra note 11, at 260.
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meaningful response to this threat, communities will remain
vulnerable to community-wide contamination incidents like
those that occurred during Hurricanes Katrina, Harvey, Maria,
and Florence.
Once toxic floodwaters occur, weeks and months pass before
contamination can be thoroughly identified and remediated, and
there are substantial hurdles to linking community harms with
particular sources of contamination in ex post tort suits. The
many hurdles to identifying defendants and proving culpability
make private law mechanisms unattractive as a tool to manage
this risk. Ex ante efforts to prevent flood-related chemical
releases should therefore guide climate change adaptation in
this area. A preventive approach, grounded in public law and
focused on making industrial facilities secure before a storm
hits, is the best path forward.
The risk from toxic floodwaters is just one of the many
challenges that policymakers face in adapting to a warmer
planet. While we may not be able to prevent flooding,
policymakers can, and should, act to reduce the risk that toxic
chemicals become part of the deluge.

